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ARTICLES

A REQUIEM FOR REGULATORY TAKINGS: RECLAIMING
EMINENT DOMAIN FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY
CLAIMS
BY
DANAYA C. WRIGHT*

For the past forty years, the United States Supreme Court has
embraced the doctrine of regulatory takings, despite being unable to
provide any coherentand reliableguidance on when a regulationgoes
so far as to require compensation. But Justice Thomas's admission in
Murr v. Wisconsin (2017) that there is no real historicalbasis for the
Court's regulatorytakings jurisprudence offers a chance to reconsider
the doctrine anew. Looking back to Justice Holmes's prophetic
statement in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, that a regulation can go
too far andrequirean exercise of eminent domain to sustain it, I argue
that the Court should embrace the common law of eminent domain to
provide a rationaland relable set of parameters for evaluating the
constitutionality of government action that stops short of physical
appropriation.In orderto reclaim eminent domain, however, the Court
would need to reject Justice Scalia's elision of the harmavoidance/benefit-conferringdistinction of Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council and embrace the balancingrule of sic utere. Italso
needs to rethink its rejection of the public interest factor in Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., for proper balancingrequires a consideration of
* Clarence J. TeSelle Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I would like
to thank the deans of the Levin College of Law for their support of this research, as well as the
invaluable comments of my colleagues, Michael Wolf, Alyson Flournoy, and Christine Klein, as
well as the support and inspiration of my three research assistants, Jackie Hutchins, Kady
Valois, and Ryan Tindall. I also want to thank the students of Lewis & Clark Law School's
Environmental Law for their hard work and dedication to making this Article as well-written
and accurate as possible. Despite their heroic efforts, any errors are those of the Author only.

[307]

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 49:307

the public interest served by government action. The Court should
embrace the balancing of harms and benefits and the offsetting of
benefits from harms that routinely occur in eminent domain
determinations.And finally, the Courtshould require that a cognizable
propertyrght be appropriatedif compensation is to be paid Thus, by
realigning our constitutionalproperty protections with the common
law of eminent domain, the incoherence of the Court's current
regulatory takngs jurisprudence can be mostly eliminated Although
there will always be hard cases, relying on the centuries-old common
law of eminent domain ratherthan the Court's failed experiment with
regulatory talngs can help provide a sensible and rational way to
balanceprivateproperty with the public welfare.
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I. INTRODUCTION

For property scholars, writing about the Takings Clause of the
Constitution is a bit like English scholars writing about Shakespeare. It
signals that one has reached an academic milestone and is prepared to
tackle one of the most confounding legal doctrines facing the courts. But
unlike the Shakespeare scholar who has 37 plays and 154 sonnets to work
with, takings scholars have only those epigrammatic twelve words, "nor
shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation,"'
1 See U.S. CONST., amend. V; Alfred Hart, The Number of Lines in Shakespeare's Plays,8
REV. ENG. STUD. 19, 21 (1932); DYMPNA CAuAGHAN, SHAKESPEARE'S SONNErS 2 (2007).
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and the framers left us with virtually no helpful guidance, interpretive
principles, or even an alphabetical concordance.2 Wandering in the dark, the
courts issue ambiguous opinions, scholars opine endlessly on the abstruse
arguments contained therein, then judges and their clerks read the
labyrinthine scholarship, only to rely on out-of-context quotations and
obscure principles in writing their bewildering and often incomprehensible
opinions. This academic feedback loop is taken to extremes in Supreme
Court scholarship3 and the high Court's opinions on the doctrine of
regulatorytakings.
A regulatory taking is deceptively simple: it occurs when a government
regulation of property goes too far in affecting property rights or values and
requires compensation to support it.4 But what constitutes property, what
constitutes a regulation,and when does the effect of the regulation go too
far are questions that have spawned hundreds of books and articles,
thousands of judicial opinions, and still we are left with more questions than
answers. One of the reasons for the sheer quantity of scholarship on the
subject is that, with each Delphic pronouncement from the Court, the
foundations shift, the questions change, and if one issue is resolved five
more are raised. In large part, the doctrine is a mess because the Court has
created a constitutional doctrine out of whole cloth just in the past forty
years, 5 and in that time it has rejected most of the common law's longstanding principles, as though regulations negatively affecting property are a
novel phenomenon.6
With countless scholars weighing in, it is not as though the world needs
another article on the Takings Clause. Yet here I offer one, in part to show
2 When we look to the original meaning of the Just Compensation Clause about the most
we can say is that it is indeterminate. There was very little discussion of the Just Compensation
Clause itself during the constitutional conventions, and the provision itself was added by
Madison at the last minute. Emily A- Johnson, Reconciling Orlglnalism and the History of the
Public Use Clause,79 FORDHAM L REv. 265, 296-97 (2010). We cannot say that the clause was
clearly intended to cover mere regulations, or that it was not. See James L Kainen, The
Historical Frameworkfor Revwing ConstitutionalProtectionfor Propertyand ContractRights,
79 CORNELL L REv. 87, 87-90 (1993) (noting the lack of consensus in scholarship in
constitutional theory regarding retroactivity); Michael B. Rappaport, Onginalism and
Regulatory Takings: Why the Ffth Amendment May Not Protect Against Regulatory Takings,
but the FourteenthAmendment May, 45 SAN DIEGO L REv. 729, 734, 743 (2008) (discussing the
"significant dispute in the scholarly literatures... exists on whether the original meaning of the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause restricts regulatory takings"); Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory
Takings and OrnginalIntent: The Drec Physical Takings Thesis "Goes Too Far",49 AM. U. L.
REV. 181, 182, 185 (1999) (stating that the "lack of historical material on the Takings Clause has
caused the original intent analysis to hinge largely on the scholar's choice of emphasis"); Kris
W. Kobach, The Ongins of Regulatory Takings: Setting the Record Stmight 1996 UTAH L. REV.
1211,1215 (1996).
3 See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
4 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon (Pennsylvania Coal), 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (finding that a
taking has occurred when regulatory restrictions on property go too far).
5 The term regulatorytakingwas not used by the Court until its 1981 decision in San Diego
Gas & Elec. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 651 (1981), which is when the doctrine really
began to have a life of its own.
6 See infr Part Ill.C.
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that I have reached that academic milestone, and in part to suggest that
perhaps the lack of comprehensible resolution in the doctrine indicates that
the experiment has failed. Perhaps more accurately, it is time to lay the
doctrine to rest, sing a requiem, release our clods of dirt onto the hollow
casket, and find a different approach to balancing the interests of private
property with the public welfare. Like the demise of substantive economic
due process eighty-five years ago,7 the past forty years have shown once
again that laissez-faire economics cannot support a legal doctrine of
fundamental property rights. The law, and property rights, must grow and
change with the public welfare, new technologies, and environmental
pressures. This Article explores the doctrine's complex indeterminacy and
the philosophical tensions at its roots with an eye toward finding a different
path, away from constitutional law and in the direction of the common law's
expansive pantheon of eminent domain.8
In the Court's most recent regulatory takings decision, the 2017 ruling
in Mart v. Wisconsin,9 Justice Thomas became the first conservative on the
Court to admit that there is no originalist justification for the regulatory
takings doctrine.' ° Historians," scholars, 2 and liberal jurists 3 have accused

7 In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court began to protect property rights
through heightened scrutiny under due process, striking down legislation that unduly hampered
private property or contract. Michael J. Phillips, Another Look at Economic Substantive Due
Process, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 265, 269-70 (1987); see discussion infra Part nII.C. As the Court set
about reining in the rampant regulations of the early twentieth century using economic
substantive due process, an invigorated Commerce Clause, and Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence, we found ourselves in an era of free-market capitalism with very little ability to
regulate the harmful effects of industrialization, labor abuses, and development. See discussion

infra Part mI.C.

8 The origin of the term eminent domain comes from Grotius, who wrote that "the

property of subjects is under the eminent domain of the state, so that the state or he who acts
for it may use and even alienate and destroy such property, not only in the case of extreme
necessity, in which even private persons have a right over the property of others, but for ends of
public utility, to which ends those who founded civil society must be supposed to have intended
that private ends should give way. But it is to be added that when this is done the state is bound
to make good the loss to those who lose their property." 1 PHIuIP NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 23 (1917). Eminent domain, therefore, meant the state has ultimate control over
property, including private property, and if it takes property for public purposes it should pay
for it. But the obligation to pay is one the state voluntarily takes on; it is not a necessary
concomitant of property, and it is not always required.
9 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
10 Seeidatl957.

11 See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and its Significance for Modem Tangs
Doctrine, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1252, 1292 (1996) ("[The] Takings clause means what it says about
land use regulation: nothing. The reason the Framers did not address land use regulation in the
Takings Clause is that they did not regard it as a taking."); see also Daniel Hulsebosch, The AntFederalist Tradition in Nineteenth-Century Talings Jurisprudence,1 N.Y.U. J.L. & IB. 967
(2005).
12

See William Treanor, The OnginalUnderstandingof the Taings Clause and the Political

Process, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782, 798-02 (1995) ("The predecessor clauses to the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause, the original understanding of the Takings Clause itself, and the

weight of early judicial interpretations of the federal and state takings clauses all indicate that
compensation was mandated only when the government physically took property."); Kobach,
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conservatives, for at least the last thirty years, of supporting a pro-property
rights agenda under the Takings Clause that has no textual or historical
basis. Yet rejecting originalism gets the Court nowhere. The supreme irony
seems to be that regulatory takings is a solution in search of a problem
where few can agree on the details of either the solution or the problem.
Hopefully the decision in Murr is a wake-up call that we are trapped in the
time warp of Lochnerism.' 4 But can we stop this ride and get off?
In the wake of unprecedented natural disasters, from Superstorm Sandy
and Hurricanes Katrina, Harvey, Irma, and Maria, to the California wildfires
and sea-level rise, our natural world is not waiting for the Court to come up
with a solution to how we balance private property rights with the public
welfare.' 5 And in this day of political partisanship and government
dysfunction, the planet is not going to idly wait for humans to stop sniping at
each other and invent a constitutional doctrine that soundly balances the
interests of public and private property. To the extent ill-conceived
regulatory takings doctrines result in chilling government action that might
actually improve, or at least forestall, the deterioration of our lived
environment, many truly feel that the Court is fiddling while Rome burns.'
In this Article I argue that regulatory takings will continue to be an
incoherent, dysfunctional mess because of fundamental differences in how
the Justices view both property rights and the proper scope of government
action. The irreconcilable tensions within the Court lead me to argue that it
should reject regulatory takings as a constitutional doctrine and turn back to
the common law of eminent domain. Even a cursory study of nineteenthcentury eminent domain cases reveals that the courts of that day faced legal
issues that were just as complex as those we face today, and those courts
used nuisance and eminent domain to balance the interests of private
property rights and the public welfare. Examining those cases, resurrecting

supra note 2, at 1215-23 (illustrating "just how entrenched the assumption is that compensable
regulatory takings were utterly alien to nineteenth-century jurisprudence").
13 See PennsyTlvnia Coa, 260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing
how the police power had traditionally included use restrictions on property that did not
require compensation); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 321-22 (2002) (opining that the language of the Fifth Amendment is silent on regulatory
takings).
14 See generalyLee Anne Fenneil & Eduardo M. Pefialver, Exactions Creep, 2013 Sup. CT.
REV. 287 (2013) (discussing a possible scenario where courts may employ heightened scrutiny
to land use regulations, similar to Lochnerism).
15 On October 6, 2018, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change issued one of the
most dire predictions yet, that humans must make drastic changes within the next decade to
avoid catastrophic climate effects. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5,C, at 14 (Oct. 2018), https://perma.cc/D2CS-DHGS (summarizing the
dramatic decrease in C02 emissions necessary to avoid exceeding the 1.50C increase in
expected global temperatures). These kinds of changes are going to severely test the regulatory
takings doctrine. See J. Peter Byrne, The CathedralEnglfted. Sea-Level Rise, PropertyRghts,
and Thme, 73 LA. L. REV. 69 (2012) (discussing the potential impact regulatory approaches to
climate change will have on regulatory takings jurisprudence).
16 See Byrne, supranote 15.
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17
nuisance from Justice Scalia's discursive elision, and embracing the tried
and true common-law rules of property, can offer a path forward out of the
regulatory takings impasse. And by limiting eminent domain to recognizable
property rights, the Court can seize the opportunity to realign our
constitutional protection of property and economic rights that Justice
Thomas's concession has provided and perhaps avoid the economic crisis
that precipitated the last major realignment in the Court's property
18
jurisprudence nearly a century ago.

II. THE INDETERMINATE LImiNAL SPACE OF REGULATORY TAKINGS
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution provides protection for
private property in two distinct provisions, the Due Process Clause and the
Just Compensation Clause.19 The amendment reads, "No person shall be...
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall
°
private property be taken for public use without just compensation." The
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the deprivation of property without due
21
process by the states, but it does not include a just compensation clause.
These provisions are generally interpreted to provide protections against
arbitrary and unreasonable government regulation through the Due Process
Clause, and against direct appropriation through the Just Compensation
Clause.u
The traditional scholarly narrative, which has been generally adopted
by the Court, holds that in its first 130 years, the Just Compensation Clause
applied only when government actually appropriated or took title to land.n
In Lucas v South CarolinaCoastalCouncil(Lucas),Justice Scalia claimed that there was
no difference between harm-prevention and benefit-conferring legislation and that therefore,
the long line of precedents permitting regulations of harm-producing behavior were no longer
sound. 505 U.S. 1003, 1026 (1992); see discussion infl- Part hII.B.
18 See Mur;,137 S. Ct 1933, 1957 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
17

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
20 Id.
19

21 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
22 See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536-37, 542 (2005).
23 See Rappaport, supra note 2, at 735-36; Treanor, supranote 12, at 796; Hart, supra note
11, at 1255-56, 1290; see also William Treanor, The Onghns and OrnginalSignificance of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Kfth AmendmenA 94 YALE L.J. 694, 711 (1985). This idea is a
perfect example of the feedback loop between scholarship and judicial opinions. Although the
Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause was not used to require compensation for
regulations, that was in large part because the Fifth Amendment did not apply to state actions,
only federal actions. Rappaport, supra note 2, at 736. Until it was incorporated in 1897, the Just
Compensation Clause was hardly used. See discussion infra Part lhI.A. Yet, the state courts
routinely ordered compensation for regulations that went too far. Id. More stunning is the fact
that even the conservative wing of the Court, including Justice Scalia, has cited this historical
understanding. Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992); see also Mur, 137 S. Ct. at 1942 (2017)
(quoting Lucas, "[Ilt was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a direct
appropriation of property, or the functional equivalent of a practical ouster of the owner's
possession"). But see Kobach, supra note 2, at 1215-23 (explaining the myth that regulatory
takings began with Pennsylvania Coal and yet how the academic feedback loop caused the
Court to pick up the flawed narrative).
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During this time, courts ordered compensation only when land itself was
appropriated by eminent domain, and the Fifth Amendment was understood
to impose a duty of compensation on governments that had, prior to 1791,
generally not been held to such a duty.24 No colonial charter or state
constitution had a just compensation provision, although some provided
procedural safeguards by requiring that appropriation be "by the Lawfull
[sic] Judgment of [one's] peers and by the Law of this province. " 2 The
historical consensus seems to be that because there were virtually no
compensation protections for property prior to adoption of the Bill of
Rights, the Constitution imposed a relatively new duty of compensation as a
way to protect private property from direct governmental appropriation. 281
24 Harry N. Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by
Government, 1789-1910, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTrTJTIONAL ORDER 132, 132-41
(Friedman & Scheiber eds., 1988); DANIEL W. HAMILTON, THE LIMITS OF SOVEREIGNTY: PROPERTY
CONFISCATION IN THE UNION AND THE CONFEDERACY DURING THE CIVIL WAR 15 (2d ed. 2007). In the
early republic, uncompensated takings for the common good, usually for right of way, were
legitimate, although compensation was common for the destruction of improved or enclosed
land. Id.at 15-16. But this was the legislature's customary duty to provide for compensation for
their own actions-the idea of a judicially-enforceable bill of rights was non-existent, and an
independent and separate judiciary were nascent in this period. See William W. Fisher II,
Ideology, Religion, and the ConstitutionalProtectionof PrivateProperty: 1760-1860, 39 EMORY
L.J. 65, 103-04 (1990). The move towards enshrining a just compensation requirement within the
Constitution itself came in the general move away from republicanism to liberalism in the years
after the Revolution. Id. at 95. The idea of a compensation requirement fit well with the
legislative sovereignty and positivism espoused by Blackstone and framers like Madison. See
Stanley N. Katz, Republicanism and the Law of Inheritancein the American Revolutionary Era,
76 MICH. L REV. 1, 6, 17 (1977); Treanor, supra note 12, at 787. The Takings Clause codified the
practice of just compensation, as the Framers sought to constrain the redistributionist impulses
of state legislatures in the 1780s. James W. Ely, Jr., "That Due SatisfactionMay Be Made.'"The
ifth Amendment and the Origins of the Compensation Principle,36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 2, 4
(1992). But even then, the Just Compensation Clause was narrowly construed to prevent only
direct, physical takings of property. Treanor, supranote 12, at 711. John Hart points out that,
whatever changes the Constitution brought, there was largely silence and status quo, as the
colonial property regime continued in the early republic. John F. Hart, Land Use Law in Early
Republic and the OriginalMeaning of the Takings Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1099, 1131-33
(2000). Compensation remained normal when a statute appropriated property, but not when a
legislature regulated according to its inherent powers. See id.at 1135; see also Treanor, supra
note 12, at 785.
25 New York Charter of Libertyes and Priviledges (1683), reprintedin 1 Bernard Schwartz,
THE BLL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY at 163-65 (Leon Friedman & Karyn Gullen
Browne eds., 1971). SeeTreanor, supra note 12, at 786-87.
26 Professor John Hart has taken great efforts to prove this view first in the colonial period.
He points to extensive regulation by legislatures in efforts to contribute to the common good, to
the extent even of compelling development and forfeiture of property rights if the owner wasted
them. See Hart, supra note 11, at 1256. Regulation also extended to protection of aesthetic
standards and wetlands, compelling enclosure, and ensuring that mines were being used as
expeditiously as society required. Id.at 1258-65. This is not to say that constraints did not exist;
property protections were generally based upon whether the regulation was prospective or
retrospective, and it was customary for governments to pay anyway (an impulse recognized
early on by the Court in Van Home's Lessee). See id at 1283; see also Van Home's Lessee v.
Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 308-13 (1795) (discussing Parliament's lack of formal
constitutional constraint but custom of paying for taken land). But there was no colonial right
to be let alone-colonial ownership, customary constraints on arbitrariness existed, but was
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The Constitution also imposed procedural safeguards through the Due
27
Process Clause for other government limitations to property. Even still, not
all states had to provide compensation until the requirement of just
compensation was incorporated to apply to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in 1897, although by then
many states had just compensation provisions in their own constitutions.'
Although the historical evidence is contested and ambiguous, we can
accurately say that there was precedent for not paying compensation even
for a direct physical appropriation of land or personal property, and there
were lots of uncompensated land-use regulations of the type that today
would likely invoke a regulatory taling claim.u But there was also precedent
that the colonies and states paid compensation both for physical
appropriations in some cases, and for regulatory actions that would qualify
as takings under today's doctrine.' There were competing views throughout
the nineteenth century about the origins of property rights and whether the
state's police power extended so far that it could limit or completely destroy
private property rights without actual appropriation.3
The traditional narrative then posits that the Court's 1922 decision in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahonn opened the door to a new doctrine-a
regulatorytaking-thatoccurs when a regulation of land goes so far as to be
equivalent to a physical appropriation and thus requires compensation.'
Pennsylvania Coal was a due process challenge involving a regulation that
prohibited certain coal mining that jeopardized surface lands.3 Justice
Holmes wrote that a regulation can go so far in hampering private property
as to require an exercise of eminent domain and compensation.u Although
the idea of regulations as takings that require compensation was not
never absolute in our modem understanding of the word. Hart, supra note 11, at 1281. The idea
that the Constitution imposed a duty to compensate has been interpreted by many
conservatives to imply that property should have fundamental-rights status. See generally
Gerald Torres, Taking and Giving:PolicePower,Public Value, and Pi'vate Right 26 ENVTL. L. 1,
9 (1996) (discussing the basic arguments by property rights advocates); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings,
102 YALE L.J. 1077 (1993) (discussing how the Court's treatment of property under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments parallels the "Court's protection of fundamental liberty rights from
Lochnerto Roe").
27 Kainen, supra note 2, at 123-41 (arguing that retroactivity shifted from being a part of
procedural due process to become a major element of substantive due process).
28 Chic., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 129 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
29 See discussion infra Part IHA.
30 Kobach, supranote 2, at 1234-59.
31 See John G. Sprankling, The PropertyJurisprudenceof Justice Kennedy, 44 McGEORGE L
REV. 61, 65-67 (2013); Treanor, supranote 12, at 699-706; Hulsebosch, supra note 11, at 971-76;
Kobach, supranote 2, at 1229-34.
32 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
33 Murr, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942 (2017) ("Mahon, however, initiated this Court's regulatory
takings jurisprudence, declaring that 'while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." (quoting Pennsylvania Coal,260 U.S. at

415)).
34 Pennsylvania Coal,260 U.S. at 412-13.
35 Id at 415 ("The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.'").
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discussed at the Supreme Court level again until 1960, it was litigated in the
lower courts, and had been for nearly a century before 19 2 2 .3
Despite the accepted narrative holding that Pennsylvania Coal was the
founding case for regulatory takings doctrine, the case did not acquire that
exalted position until many decades later.37 Pennsylvania Coalwas cited by
the Supreme Court only a handful of times between 1922 and 1960, all for
due process considerations about exercises of the police power that did not
satisfy the heightened scrutiny of Lochner-era substantive economic due
process.3 When the Court found a sufficient safety or public health
justification, it upheld exercises of the police power that severely restricted,
or even destroyed, private property rights, as in Nebbia v. People of New
YorP1 and Weaver v. Palmer Brothers Co. None of these due process cases
that cited to Pennsylvania Coal involved the issue of compensation for a
regulation that went too far. In all cases in which the Court ruled the police
power was exceeded, the regulation was struck down (a due process
remedy); compensation was never ordered.4 Even despite Justice Holmes's
dicta that compensation would be due for overreaching regulations, the
remedy the Court ordered in PennsylaniaCoalwas the due process remedy
of rescission rather than compensation.e
The Supreme Court did not order compensation as a remedy for a
regulatory act until 1960 in Armstrong v. United States (Arnstrong),4 when
See discussion bifa Part IV.A; Kobach, supra note 2, at 1234-L53.
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48-49 (1960).
38 The Lochner-era is a term defining the period between about 1890 and 1937 in which the
Court struck down numerous pieces of economic legislation under a variety of constitutional
grounds. See discussion ira Part III.C. If the legislation was passed by a state legislature, it
was struck down under the Due Process Clause or the Contracts Clause; if it was passed by
Congress, it was struck down under the Commerce Clause or the Tenth Amendment. Id.The
Court heightened the level of scrutiny over economic legislation, demanding that the
government prove that the law was necessary to protect public safety or had a legitimate
welfare and morals justification. Id.
39 291 U.S. 502, 538-39 (1934) (upholding a price control regulation because it was in the
public interest).
40 270 U.S. 402, 414-15 (1926) (striking down a regulation prohibiting use of a shoddy, in
the interest of protecting public health, as purely arbitrary).
41 In many of the cases citing Pennsylvania Coal during this period, the issues involved
state railroad commissions requiring that railroads pay for the costs of separating the grade of
their tracks from the roadways or in the constitutionality of other health and safety regulations.
See, e.g., Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 412 (1935); Delaware,
L. & W.R. Co. v. Town of Morristown, 276 U.S. 182, 188 (1928); Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v.
State Highway Comm'n of Kan., 294 U.S. 613, 614-15 (1935); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R.
Comm'n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 589 (1926).
42 See Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923); Charles Wolff Packing
Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations of State of Kan., 262 U.S. 522, 544 (1923); Weaver, 270 U.S. at
415; Frost& FrostTrucking Co., 271 U.S. at 599.
43 260 U.S. 393, 413-14 ("It is our opinion that the act cannot be sustained as an exercise of
the police power.").
44 364 U.S. 40 (1960). For takings cases before 1960 for awards of just compensation in light
of physical intrusion or seizure, see generally United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)
(compensation awarded due to invasion of private airspace); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S.
166 (1871) (involving physical invasion by flood waters); United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S.
36
37
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the combined effect of a government contract and sovereign immunity
resulted in the destruction of materialman liens held by private companies
on ships being built for the United States.4 Until at least 1960, it seemed the
Court viewed the Pennsylvania Coal case only as a due process case that
restricted exercises of the police power if property rights were destroyed or
materially impaired without a sufficiently important public interest." That
interpretation changed with Armstrong, however, which first cited
Pennsylvania Coalfor the proposition that compensation, not just rescission,
could also be an appropriate remedy if property rights were destroyed by
government actions. 7 Between 1960 and 1978, the Court cited Pennsylvania
Coal only five times, and only once on the compensation question raised in
Arnstrong,and it held in that case that no taking had occurred.4 For over
half a century, Pennsylvania Coal stood for the unremarkable proposition
that government regulations affecting property had to further some
purpose and not that
important public health, safety, or welfare
49
compensation could be an appropriate remedy.
That changed in 1978, however, with the Court's pivotal decision in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York Cityn Armstrong was the
central case cited for the general proposition that a regulation could go so
far in limiting private property that compensation would be required. 5' But

745 (1947) (action involving the physical invasion by flood waters); United States v. Kans. City
Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950) (compensation for flooding caused by navigable waters);
United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951) (just compensation for operating costs
resulting from the temporary seizure of a coal mine during wartime).
45 As Justice Black remarked in Armstrong the "Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private
property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 364 U.S. at 49.
46 It is important to note that the due process analysis in the Lochner and post-Lochner era
focused on the importance of the government's interest, i.e., the public health, safety, and
welfare. D. Benjamin Barros, The Police Power and The Takings Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV.
471, 489 (2004). Where the government's interest was notably weak and the interference with
property rights great, the Court found a due process violation and struck down the law. See
discussion infra Part III.C. The Court's current regulatory takings jurisprudence, however, has
somehow morphed from its due process roots into a calculation completely devoid of any
analysis of the government's interest. Id
47 Armstrong,364 U.S. at 48-49. Notably, rescission would not have been a viable remedy in
Armstrong, which suggests that these early regulatory takings cases evolved as exceptions,
providing an equitable remedy when no other appropriate remedy existed.
48 See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (holding there was no taking
when a town enjoined a sand and gravel pit operator from doing business until it obtained a
permit); see also City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965) (Texas statute limiting the
period of time to recover forfeited lands); Jankovich v. Ind. Toll Road Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487
(1965) (involving interplay between federal and state airport zoning acts): Chongris v. Corrigan,
409 U.S. 919 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (denial of cert for involving airport zoning);
Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978) (action challenging a flat federal tax on
aircraft to pay for federal aviation infrastructure and services).
49 See Barros, supranote 46, at 471 (arguing that the police power was narrowed during the
Lochneryearsfrom anything that benefitted the public to only health and safety legislation).
50 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
51 Id at 123-24.
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seeking a more distant precedent, the Court cited to Pennsylvania Coal as
"the leading case for the proposition that a state statute that substantially
furthers important public policies may so frustrate distinct investmentbacked expectations as to amount to a 'taking. ' ' The Court also cited
Pennsylvania Coal for the counter-proposition that "[g]overnment hardly
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law."" Since
1978, however, the Court has cited Pennsylvania Coal thirty-three times and
only for the proposition that a regulation might go so far as to require
compensation, thus perpetuating the misleading narrative that Pennsylvania
Coal is the founding case for the regulatory takings doctrine. Ignoring the
case's due process meaning and its precedential legacy from 1922 to 1960,
the Court fabricated a pedigree for its regulatory takings doctrine that gives
it a larger historical significance, although it has also had to reckon with
Pennsylvania Coals role in the now-discredited substantive economic due
process of the Lochnerera.
One of the many ironies of the development of regulatory takings is
that, besides the fact that Pennsylvania Coal did not become a case about
compensation until 1960, Penn Centralwas not supposed to set a precedent
about regulatory takings at all.54 Justice Brennan instructed his clerk to draft
an opinion that resolved the issue in Penn Centralin such a way as not to
establish a precedent.' The ad hoe balancing the Court used was supposed
to presage that there was no test and no doctrine for regulatory takings; it
was simply a case of fact-specific inquiry into when the unusual effects of a
regulation went so far, and its effects were so egregious, the Justices would
either strike the law or order compensation if rescission was an inadequate
remedy.M The Penn Centraltest-that-was-not-supposed-to-be-a-test consists
of "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, designed to allow careful
examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances. "5' When a
regulation significantly impedes the use of property, the Court has analyzed
three factors, "(1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2)
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investmentbacked expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action. " 8
The fact that the Court was trying not to establish a test, but inadvertently
Id at 127.
Id at 124.
54 See Richard J. Lazarus, Transcript"Looking Back on Penn Central: A Panel Discussion
wFith the Supreme Court Litfgators,15 FORDHAM ENVTL L. REV. 287, 307-08 (2004).
55 See id at 304, 307-08.
56 Ironically, the Court was not planning on enunciating a binding test; rather, it hoped to
render a decision in that case that would have no precedential force. See id.at 302-04 (Justice
Brennan's clerk at the time of Penn Central,discussing that Justice Stewart's clerk had urged
him to "make the opinion very, very narrow." Rehnquist's clerk further explaining that the
Justices were concerned about the implications of the opinion would have on other contexts.).
57 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting
Penn Central,438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) and Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001)
(O'Connor J., concurring)).
58 Murr, 137 S. Ct 1933, 1943 (2017) (citing Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617; Penn Central,438
U.S. at 124).
52
63
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did so, and used a precedent that was not really a precedent, is symptomatic
of the shifting sands on which regulatory takings doctrine rests.9
Perhaps recognizing that Penn Centralwas not supposed to establish a
bright-line regulatory takings test, pro-property-rights Justices pushed the
Court to adopt more property-protectionist rules in later cases. 60 There are
two instances in which the Court eschewed the multi-factor balancing test
first articulated in Penn Central for a more bright-line test: when the
regulation compels a physical invasion onto private land, ' or when a
regulation results in a 100% loss in the value of the property.u Landowners
often try to manipulate their situation into the 100% economic loss per se
rule, which would automatically compel compensation, while governments
argue that if any value remains to regulated property, the appropriate
analysis is the three-factor balancing test of Penn Central. But despite all
the hand-wringing and concern, neither of the per se tests has dramatically
changed the takings game, for governments or landowners.6
At bottom, however, the idea is simple. When government physically
appropriatesland or other property it exercises its eminent domain power, it
must pay just compensation under the Just Compensation Clause, and the
taking must be for a public use. 6 States may also regulate private property
under their police power, or Congress may do so under the Commerce
Clause. Those regulations are subjected to rational basis analysis under the
Due Process Clause, and in most instances the regulatory effect on property
is deemed constitutionally valid.6 In fact, the last time the Court struck
59 For example, Eric Claeys argues that "the doctrinal problems that have accreted around
Penn Central over the last 25 years are a muddle of Penn Central§ making." Eric Claeys,
Takings, Regulations,andNaturalProperyRights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1556 (2003).
60 See id. at 1556-58.
61 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 458 (1982).
62 Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
63 Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. 302, 319-22 (2002).
64 There have been over seventy law review articles with Lucas in the title just since 1992,
presaging all sorts of disasters. See, e.g., Steven Ward, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council:
A CategoricalRule in the Muddle of Takings Analysis, 61 UMKC L. REv. 165 (1992); Cotton
Harness, Lucas and the Rebirth of Lochner, 2 S.C. ENvm L.J. 57 (1992); Jonathan Federman,
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: An Antiquated Response to A Modem Problem, 57
ALB. L. REV. 213 (1993). And although the jurisprudence of the Court has not been profoundly
altered, it is likely that the case did lead to some chilling effect in state and local governments.
See Mark Fenster, Takings Fornnalsm and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the
Consequences of Clarity, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 609, 616-17 (2004); Mark Fenster, Regulating Land
Use in a ConstitutionalShadow: The InstitutionalContexts of Exactions,58 HASTINGS L.J. 729,
729-32 (2007).
65 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,483-84 (2005); Rubenfeld, supranote 26, at
1081-91 (discussing eminent domain and the distinctions between it and regulations that do not
use but only devalue private property).
6 The Court's current test for whether a regulation passes due process muster is "shocks
the conscience." Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847-50 (1998). Thus, so long as a
regulation does not shock the conscience, the Court is likely to uphold it as a valid exercise of
the police power, although such a finding does not compel a finding that the regulation does not
constitute a taking without just compensation. See City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty.
Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 199 (2003); J. Peter Byrne, Due Process Land Use Claims After
Lingle, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 471,479-80 (2007).
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down a piece of economic legislation under the Due Process Clause was in
1936 in Morehead v. New York ex rel l7paldo6 7 when the Court struck down
New York's minimum wage act.n Assuming a regulation satisfies the Due
Process Clause, however, in certain instances the effects of a regulation or
other non-appropriatory government action on private property are deemed
so significant as to require compensation.6 Thus, regulatory takings lies in
the liminal space between due process and eminent domain. It occurs when
a regulation "goes too far" or when "justice and fairness" require that public
benefits disproportionately borne by a few must be compensated. ° But after
nearly forty years, we are no closer
to knowing when a regulation goes too
71
far than "I know it when I see it."
This shifting of the precedential meaning of Pennsylvania Coal,and the
ubiquitous narrative that it is the founding case of the regulatory takings
doctrine, has led to the common assertion that 1922 was the turning point in
using the Just Compensation Clause to protect private property from
regulation. More accurately, however, that shift occurred in 1960 with the
decision in Armstrongwhen compensation was first ordered for a regulatory
action. Or more precisely still, that shift truly occurred in 1978 when the
Penn Central case legitimated the doctrine by creating the now wellestablished balancing test.72 And those decades matter. On the one hand, we
could easily have relegated Pennsylvania Coalto the dustbin of Lochner-era
substantive economic due process if the case had not been resurrected in
1960, just as the Court was insisting that the Due Process Clause protections
of property receive only rational basis review. For the conservative Justices
who want to use the Takings Clause to retrieve a heightened level of scrutiny

67

298 U.S. 587 (1936).

68 Id. at 609.
69 SeeE. Enters

v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 537-38 (1998); Lingle, 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005).

70 E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 523; id. at 540 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
71 Justice Potter Stewart wrote these iconic words in an obscenity

case in 1964 in his brief
concurrence in J~cobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Even the
Court admits that it cannot seem to come up with a coherent set of rules for when a regulation
goes too far. The conservative Justice Scalia explained that in "70-odd years of succeeding
'regulatory takings' jurisprudence, we have generally eschewed any 'set formula' for
determining how far is too far." Lucas,505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). The more moderate Justice
Kennedy has cited the same claim, elaborating that a "central dynamic of the Court's regulatory
takings jurisprudence thus is its flexibility." Murr, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1937 (2017). Additionally, the
liberal Justice Ginsburg has noted that "[iun view of the nearly infinite variety of ways in which
government actions or regulations can affect property interests, the Court has recognized few
invariable rules in this area,... most takings claims turn on situation-specific factual inquiries."
Ark. Fish & Game Comm'n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 31 (2012). Thus, despite the fact that
the conservative Justices have tried to push for more bright-line, per se rules, they have all
agreed that there are only two per se rules and even those have gaping holes, and they have left
lower courts to read the tea leaves of their hotly contested 5-4 decisions to deduce when the
factual circumstances are likely to be recognized as going so far as to require compensation.
72 Both commentators and the Supreme Court allege that 1922 was the founding of the
regulatory takings doctrine. See, e.g, Palazzolo,533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001); Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S.
302, 325 (2002) ("[Ilt was Justice Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon... that

gave birth to our regulatory takings jurisprudence.")
73 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-33 (1963).

320

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 49:307

in economic regulatory cases, the older the pedigree the better. Although
historians have soundly disproved any originalist pretensions to
constitutional limits on regulation through the Just Compensation Clause,74
originalists like Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas embraced regulatory
takings doctrine despite its bastard pedigree, glossing over the clear
evidence that the framers never intended the Takings Clause to apply to
mere police power regulations. 5 Justice Thomas's admission in Murr,
therefore, may blow some of the smoke from the cloud of history that lies
over the Pennsylvania Coal case, and for that reason alone is quite
remarkable."6
But even after its most recent decision in Mu!n, the Court's regulatory
takings jurisprudence remains a muddled mess, and the divisions run deep.
Yet two points are indisputable. The liberals on the Court are not willing to
abolish the doctrine and adopt the historical narrative that regulations are
reviewed only under due process, especially so long as due process review
continues to be extremely deferential and toothless.7 At the same time, the
conservatives on the Court are not willing to adopt the robust view of some
scholars that all regulations require compensation, even if they have only a
minor effect on private property.8 All members of the Court continue to
assert that ad hoe balancing is the best compromise because none seem
willing to adopt a pure version of any bright-line test. 9 Moreover, only
Justice Thomas seems willing to abolish the doctrine altogether, but he does
so in favor of some other mechanism for protecting property rights, like the
Due Process Clause, the Privileges or Immunities Clause, or the Equal

See Hart, supranote 11; Treanor, supranote 12.
Treanor, supra note 12, at 805. This is not to say that state courts had not interpreted
their Just Compensation Clauses to apply to non-physical government actions in limited cases
from the early 1800s on. They used an expansive definition of eminent domain, which had long
jurisprudential roots. See discussion infra Part III.A.
76 Mur, 137 S. Ct. at 1957 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
77 We see this when the liberal Justices take the position to affirm regulatory takings in
cases that would not qualify under a true originalist interpretation, such as Justice Ginsburg's
opinion in Ark. Fish & Game, 568 U.S. 23, 33 (2012); Justice Brennan's famous dissent in San
Diego Gas & Elec., 450 U.S. 621, 639-43, 660-61 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); and Justice
Blackmun's opinion in Ruckeishaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,1000-05,1012-13 (1984).
78 There are a number of conservative property rights scholars who argue that virtually all
government devaluation of property should be compensated. The poster boy for that position is
Richard Epstein, whose pathbreaking book Taking. PrivateProperty,and the Powerof Eminent
Domain, has bolstered an army of pro-property rights absolutists like Roger and Nancie
Mazulla, the Pacific Legal Foundation, and numerous others. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 1-6 (1985); Roger J Marzulla & Nancie
G. Marzulla, Regulatory Takings in The United States Claims Court-Adjusting the Burdens that
in FairnessandEquity Ought to be Borne bySocietyas a Whole, 40 CATH. U. I. REv. 549 (1991).
79 John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative Right; 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1015
(2003) ("Indeed, while the justices have often widely disagreed over the scope of
the regulatory takings doctrine, it is remarkable that in the eighty years since Mahon was
decided, no justice has suggested that the regulatory takings doctrine be reconsidered (or be
limited to cases of physical occupation), nor has any justice suggested that
the regulatory takings doctrine should encompass all new restrictions on the use of private
property. All seem to agree that either extreme would be unacceptable.").
74
75
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Protection Clause.2 With each new takings decision, commentators predict
either the demise of regulatory takings,"' the demise of regulations,8 or a
continuance of the ad hocely that characterizes the jurisprudence today.2
And just as Congress is wont to do, kicking the can down the road seems to
be the Court's twenty-first century approach to difficult legal and social
problems. Fundamental differences in constitutional philosophy and
conflicting views of property rights have turned a non-existent constitutional
doctrine into an incoherent and very sticky one.

Il. FUNDAMENTAL INCONGRUITIES: THE MUDDLED MESS OF REGULATORY
TAKINGS
One of the reasons regulatory takings doctrine is deemed by so many to
be incomprehensible and irrational is that the Justices hold competing views
of property, of the proper role of government, and of the Constitution's role
in protecting property. 4 These competing views often align along what are
considered to be the liberal and conservative philosophies of the Justices.2

80 See Rappaport, supranote 2, at 744-48 (suggesting that privileges or immunities might be
a better choice to justify regulatory takings); Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65
(2000) (finding that the Equal Protection Clause may protect against regulatory harms to land).
81 For instance, after the Court's 2017 decision in Murr v. Wisconsin, outlining a balancing
test for determining the denominator in takings determinations, many commentators suggested
that the Court was tossing its regulatory takings into the garbage can and would grant deference
to regulators. See, e.g, Stewart E. Sterk, DuelingDenorninatorsand the Demise of Lucas, 60
ARmz. L. REV. 67, 87-89 (2018); Sara Beachey, et al., Murr v. Wisconsin, The LargerParcelAsue
and the Futureof RegulatoryTakings Slides,ALI.-CLE Course Materials (July 25, 2017).
82 Other commentators have interpreted pro-property rights takings decisions as presaging
the demise of regulations and the police power. See, e.g., John G. Sprankling, Propertyand the
Roberts Court 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 16 (2016); Garrett Power, Requiem for Regulation,44 ENVTL.
L. REP. (EnvtL L. Inst) 10923, 10926 (2014). The Justices also envision such drastic effects, as
Justice Kagan predicted in Koontz v. St Johns River WaterMgmt Dist, 570 U.S. 595, 626 (2013)
(Kagan, J., dissenting) ("The majority's approach, on top of its analytic flaws, threatens
significant practical harm.").
83 See, e.g, Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrne, 24 CARDOZO L.
REV. 93, 107-08 (2002); F. Patrick Hubbard, Palazzolo, Lucas, and Penn Central: The Need for
Pragmatism,Symbolsm, andAdHoc Balancing,80 NEB. L REV. 465, 472 (2001); Mark Fenster,
The Stubborn IncoherenceofRegulatory Takings, 28 STAN. ENvT. L.J. 525, 544-46 (2009).
84 See James E. Krier, The Takings-Puzzle Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1143, 1143 (1997)
("Regulatory takings are widely regarded as a puzzle.... [Tihe opening cich6 in most of the
scholarly commentary is that the law in this area is a bewildering mess.").
85 Although it is inaccurate to call the Justices liberal and conservative, because the liberal
wing of the Court are not true liberals and the conservatives are not traditional conservatives
either, the terms are too ubiquitous to ignore. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Progressive and
Conservative Constitutionalismas the United States Enters the 21st Century, 67 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 53, 54 (2004). The liberal wing consists of Justices Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor,
Kagan, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and the later years of Stevens. See, e.g, id at 54-55. The
conservative wing is steady, consisting of Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Alito, Roberts, Thomas,
and Gorsuch. See, e.g, id. at 54. The centrist Justices, who are in fact quite conservative, are
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, who often provided the swing vote in many of the 5-4 takings
decisions. See, e.g., id at 58-59; see alsoJames Henretta, CharlesEvansHughes and the Strange
Death of Liberal Amenica, 24 L. & HIST. REV. 115 (2006) (discussing American liberalism's
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Thus, the liberal wing generally views property rights as positivist creatures
of law, approves regulation of property, and is deferential to the
government; hence, the liberals view regulatory takings cases with great
skepticism. 8 The liberals often feel that regulatory takings is an illegitimate
constitutional doctrine because it has no historical foundation, unduly
hampers important government protection of the public welfare and the
environment, and often results in windfalls to landowners who game the
system.8 The conservative wing, on the other hand, feels that property rights
are fundamental natural rights that pre-exist fallible and over-reaching
government; without constitutional limits on government regulation, private
property would be hijacked to serve public uses without compensation; and
that we have, and need, a long history of constitutional protections for
property that should be acknowledged and perpetuated.
Needless to say, neither narrative is completely true or accurate as a
description of history, law, or principles of natural justice." But these
differences profoundly affect the rationale of the Court's opinions, the
precedents it sets for lower courts, and even the public's perceptions of the
Court's legitimacy. The liberal model tells a story of a constitutional doctrine
run amok, and the conservative model tells a story of government run amok.
To conservatives, private property is being constantly eroded for some
amorphous public benefit, while to liberals the public treasury is being used
to pay landowners not to damage the environment or create a nuisance.0 To
say that the Court's regulatory takings doctrine is a muddled mess is an
understatement, not because the Justices cannot agree on a doctrine so
much as because they keep undermining their own rationales and rejecting
the pieces and rules and considerations that might give the doctrine some
kind of internal logic.91
departure from traditional progressive-era liberalism, by focusing on the career of Justice
Hughes).
86 See Christopher Serkin, The New Politics of New Propertyand the Taings Clause,42
VT. L. REv. 1, 4, 8 (2017) (describing the traditional liberal view of property rights and the
Takings Clause).
87 See Justice Kagan's dissent in Koontz; 570 U.S. at 626, for her argument that the
majority's decision would have drastic effects on local land use regulation and service delivery;
and, of course, Justice Blackmun's colorful symbolism in his dissent in Lucas is legendary:
"Today the Court launches a missile to kill a mouse." 505 U.S. 1003, 1036 (1992) (Blacknun, J.,
dissenting). In that same dissent, Justice Blackmun questioned the majority's decision to move
away from ad hoc balancing that considers the public interest Id. at 1047. He cautioned against
landowners marketing specialized estates to fit within the Court's per se rules. Id at 1065; see
also Penn Centra, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
88 Justice Roberts, in Mur, charged the government with "gerrymandering" to avoid takings
claims. 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1956 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun noted that the
Fifth Amendment "stands as a shield against the arbitrary use of governmental power." Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980).
89 See Huslebosch, supra note 11, at 974 (describing colonial and early republican notions
of property in traditional common law forms and its modification in the nineteenth century to
the bundle of sticks).
90 See Serkin, supra note 86, at 6.
91 For instance, some of the most obvious incongruities are whether or not the Court
should adopt per se rules; whether the government interest should be a factor, and even

2019]

REQUIEM FOR REGULATORY TAKINGS

Also clouding the waters is the discursive move that Justice Scalia
made in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council," in which he rejected
longstanding common-law distinctions between harm-prevention and
benefit-conferring legislation.' For well over a hundred years, lower courts
had distinguished between the two in nuisance cases, striking legislation or
requiring compensation when legislation was designed to confer a benefit
but not when it prevented harm to other landowners9 The elision, designed
to push the Court toward more concrete per se rules, profoundly
undermined the coherence of regulatory takings doctrine. And I would argue
that the move has proven to be so unworkable that the Court has been
forced to reject the per se rule Justice Scalia hoped to entrench, instead
adding even more indeterminacy and ad-hocery in its 2017 decision in Murrn
A further factor making the doctrine so unbalanced is the pickle the
Court has found itself in as a result of its deferential due process
jurisprudence following the Lochner era. From the 1890s to 1937, the Court
engaged in heightened judicial activism by striking down economic
legislation under a severely cramped interpretation of the Commerce Clause,
and expansive interpretations of the Due Process Clause and the Tenth
Amendment.' When Justice Owen Roberts switched sides in 1937, the Court
essentially relegated due process review of economic legislation to a
toothless rational basis test.97 In so doing, the Court dramatically eroded its

whether Penn Coal or Keystone Bituminous should be appropriate precedent. Even when the
Court overturns itself it does not do so explicitly. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 474 (1987) (essentially reversing its decision in Pennsylvania Coal
without actually reversing it); Brown v. Legal Found. of WasL, 538 U.S. 216, 241 (2003) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (essentially undermining the Court's decision in Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found,
524 U.S. 156 (1998)).
92 See Louise A. Halper, Why the Nuisance Knot Can't Undo the Takings Muddle, 28 IND. L.
REv. 329, 329, 334 (1995) (explaining how Justice Scalia's opinion blending formalism,
modernism and post-modernism in Lucas causes confusion, rather than providing clarity);
Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of the "Harm/Benefit"and "AverageReciprocity ofAdvantage"Rules
in a Comprehensive TakingsAnalysis, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1449, 1470-81 (1997).
93 See discussion infra Part ]f.B.
94 See id; Halper, supra note 92, at 346-47 (discussing how courts in South Carolina have
historically recognized this nuisance distinction in their jurisprudence).
95 See discussion infra Part IV.A
96 See MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS, THE LOCHNER COURT, MYTH AND REALITY: SUBSTANTIvE DUE
PROCESS FROM THE 1890S TO THE 1930s, at 11 (2001).

97 Much ink has been spilt on the switch in time that saved nine, the legend that President
Roosevelt's threatened court-packing plan pressured Justice Roberts into changing his votes on
economic legislation, thus effectively ending the Lochner era of heightened scrutiny on
economic substantive due process cases. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL
COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 11, 13, 21 (1998). Some scholars have
disagreed with the assertion that Justice Owen Roberts changed his vote because of pressure,
not because of ideology, suggesting that he had never fully supported the heightened review of
economic legislation and that his switch was not so unusual as to be attributable to the pressure
of Roosevelt's plan. See, e.g., id. Regardless of the cause of Roberts's vote, the effect is
undeniable. After 1936 the Court never again struck down economic legislation as a violation of
the Due Process Clause under any semblance of heightened review. Id. at 13. Since that time,
the Court has routinely been faced with an opportunity to elevate review, and it has consistently
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ability to review economic legislation, leaving governments' ability to
regulate property essentially unchecked. Because the Lochner-era Court
went so far overboard in striking down economic legislation during a period
of economic crisis, the modem Court hesitates to revive anything resembling
substantive economic due process. This hesitation, in the opinion of many
scholars, has led the Court to distort the Just Compensation Clause to do the
work of the Due Process Clause, inevitably confounding the fundamentally
distinctive issues of eminent domain and due process."9 More confounding is
the fact that when the Court admitted it had merged the two in Lingle v.
Chevron USA, Inc.,'0 it rejected any analysis of the government's
justification in its regulatory takings test, ironically making it even more
difficult to do ad hoc balancing.' °1
When we combine the effects of the competing narratives, competing
philosophies about property generally, the discursive elision of nuisance
law, and the tensions over due process, we find a regulatory takings doctrine
that is irretrievably incoherent. It is not simply a muddled mess, as so many
scholars have called it; 1 2 rather, it is so internally conflicted that the only
way forward is to change course altogether. It is time to consider that
regulatory takings may not be the answer to balancing private property and
the public welfare, especially in this time of critical climate change and its
predicted devastating effects on our entire world. Absolute property rights
contributed to the economic crisis of the Great Depression and are on track
to contribute to the devastating effects of climate change.
A. IrreconcilableDifferencesin JurisprudentialPhilosophy
Much of the irreconcilability of regulatory takings doctrine lies in the
fact that the Court has deployed competing narratives about the origins and
justifications for its constitutional review of regulations that relies on
ideological beliefs with little basis in fact. The liberal narrative of the
doctrine as illegitimate in origin and wielded injudiciously to chill
government action is just as inaccurate as the conservative narrative of
government run amok.

refused to do so, citing the negative effects of the Lochner era- See PHuiPs, supra note 96, at
32.
Ronald J. Krotoszynsld, Jr., Expropiatory
98 PHILips, supra note 96, at 5-6. See, e.g.,
Intent Defining the ProperBoundariesof SubstantiveDue Processand the Takings Clause,80
N.C. L. REv. 713, 717 (2002).
99 See, e.g., Krotoszynski, supra note 98, at 715; Byrne, supranote 66, at 472; Michael Allan
Wolf, Taking Regulatory Takings Personally The Perils of (Mis)reasoningby Analogy, 51 ALA L.
REv.1355, 1361 (2000).
100 544 U.S. 528, 542-43 (2005).
101 Id.at 547-48.

102 Carol Rose has called it a "muddled mess," and others have called it even worse names.
See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed-Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S.CAL. L.
REV. 561 (1984); see also Poirier, supranote 83, at n.2 (providing numerous examples of names
used to refer to the doctrine).
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The liberal narrative, usually espoused by Justices Stevens, Blackmun,
Breyer, and sometimes Souter, views property rights as malleable to be
analyzed holistically, ad hoc balancing as preferable to per se rules, that the
public interest is a key element in weighing the effects of regulations, and
that regulatory takings doctrine should be applied sparingly because of its
questionable historical basis and chilling effect.1°3 A couple of points
illustrate this approach. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in Lucas, criticized
the majority for creating a per se takings rule that side-stepped the need for
balancing and, most importantly, eliminated the need to consider the public
interest. '4 He wrote:
I first question the Court's rationale in creating a category that obviates a "casespecific inquiry into the public interest advanced,"... This is so because
although we have articulated certain factors to be considered, including the
economic impact on the property owner, the ultimate conclusion "necessarily
requires a weighing of private and public interests. " "'
For the liberals, consideration of the public interest is crucial in any
regulatory takings analysis.
Justice Blackmun also criticized Justice Scalia's reference to some
historical compact regarding the fundamentality of property.'0 He relied on
Professors Treanor, Bosselman, and Horwitz's work uncovering the original
meaning of the Just Compensation Clause as primarily limiting only direct
appropriations of property, and not regulations. '°' In his dissent in Lucas,
Justice Stevens also cautioned against "illogical expansion of the concept of
'regulatory takings.'"'l He warned that the "elastic nature of property rights"
will make the Court's categorical rule unworkable. 1n
In addition to viewing property rights as malleable and subject to the
public interest, liberals also worried that landowners would manufacture
takings claims, especially under the per se rule of Lucas. Justice Stevens
expressed the standard liberal narrative that
developers and investors may market specialized estates to take advantage of
the Court's new rule.... Either courts will alter the definition of the
"denominator" in the takings "fraction," rendering the Court's categorical rule
meaningless, or investors will manipulate the relevant property interests, giving
the Court's rule sweeping effect."'

103 See, e.g., Lucas,505 U.S. 1003,1036-37 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

Id at 1047-48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
105 Id at 1047 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
106 Id at 1055-56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
107 Id.
at 1055-59 (Blackmnun, J., dissenting).
108 Id at 1061 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109 Id at 1065 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110 Id at 1065-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Blackmun's Lucas dissent was prescient. The
2017 MurT decision ultimately changed the denominator rules to render the categorical taking
rule of Lucasvitually meaningless. See Sterk, supranote 81, at 88.
104

326

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

. [Vol. 49:307

In all, the liberals on the Court are quite critical about the questionable
history of regulatory takings and the appropriateness of per se rules in an
area of law on which the uniqueness of land is a fundamental precept. They
view property rights as positivist"' creatures of law that serve public
interests, and their concern about landowner manipulation reveals their
deep ambivalence about regulatory takings generally.
By contrast, the conservative narrative focuses on the need to protect
private property from overreaching government imbued with sovereign
power."2 The conservatives have been quite successful in characterizing the
typical regulatory takings plaintiff as David taking on Goliath. The state is
seen by the conservatives as a giant whirlpool that swallows all in its path,
absorbing and exercising power to the detriment of individual rights and
liberties. Conservatives worry that the ever-expanding coercive power of the
state, which already maintains the privileged position of dictating and
defining property through legislation and jurisprudence, may stack the deck
both substantively and procedurally to ensure that it can take private
property for public uses without oversight or the responsibility to pay for
it."3 Theirs is a statement about power more than about property.14 And for
the conservatives, power is something exercised over property with
property being a bulwark against illegitimate power. To the liberals, power is
property and property is power. To the conservatives, power should protect
property.

111 Sometimes scholars discuss the twentieth-century jurists as having a utilitarian view of
property rights. See, e.g., D. Benjamin Barros, Defining "Property"in the Just Compensation
contradictions
1854
(1995) (recognizing
1853,
Clause 63 FORDHAM L. REv.
between utilitarian and liberal notions of property); Robert Brauneis, "The Foundationof our

'RegulatoryTakings' Jurisprudence" The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613 (1996) (discussing Justice Holmes's
positivist ahistorical notion of property); Daniel R. Mandelker, New PropertyRights Under the
Taking Clause,81 MARQ. L. REv. 9, 16 (1997) (discussing the "segmentation" problem in takings
law starting with Justice Holmes's treatment of it). The label does not matter as much as the
differences. Natural law scholars view property rights as having core elements that cannot be
infringed without running afoul of the Due Process or Just Compensation Clause. See e.g.,
Claeys, supra note 59. Positivists and utilitarians view property rights as open to adjustment to
serve public, utilitarian ends. Glenn Fox, The Origins, Nature, and Content of the RMght to
Property:Five Economic Solitudes,60 CAN. J. AGRIC. ECON. 11, 29 (2012).
112 Between 1978, when the regulatory takings doctrine was articulated in Penn Central,and
1986, when Justice Antonin Scalia came to the bench, there was a growing pressure on the
Court from property rights advocates to find some effective way to rein in what they perceived
were over-reaching environmental and land use restrictions. See Richard J. Lazarus, The
Measure of a Justice:Justice Scala and the Falteringof the PropertyRights Movement Within
the Supreme Court,57 HASTINGS L.J. 759, 823-25 (2006) (discussing Justice Scalia's role in the
property rights movement).
113 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Public Trust Doctrine:A ConservativeReconstruction
&Defense, 15 SE. ENvTL. L.J. 47, 56 (2006).
114 For conservatives, property rights tend to be relatively static and absolute, and
government is always and inevitably limiting and infringing property rights. See, e.g., EPSTEIN,
supranote 78; RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 56-61 (4th ed. 1992); Douglas
W. Kmiec, The Original Understandingof the Takings Clause Is Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 1630, 1639-40 (1988).
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Chief Justice Roberts, in his dissent in Mur, dutifully trotted out the
narrative of a government manipulating its regulations to avoid takings
liability." 5 He wrote that:
In departing from state property principles, the majority authorizes
governments to do precisely what we rejected in Penn Central create a
litigation-specific definition of "property" designed for a claim under the
Takings Clause. Whenever possible, governments in regulatory takings cases
will ask courts to aggregate legally distinct properties into one "parcel," solely
for purposes of resisting a particular claim." 6
He referred to it as "just another opportunity to gerrymander the definition
of 'private property' to defeat a takings claim. " 1 17 Chief Justice Roberts
alleged in Murr that "the government's goals shape the playing field before
the contest over whether the challenged regulation goes 'too far' even gets
underway."

One commonly cited instance of this government-as-Goliath narrative is
the oft-repeated line from Webb's FabulousPharmacies,Inc. v. Beckwith"9

that "a State, by ipse dxi4 may not transform private property into public
property without compensation." 20 Another favorite of the conservatives on
the Court is that the "State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the
Lockean bundle."' 2' Uses of the Webb's Fabulous Pharmaciesquote have
primarily come in the opinions of conservatives and most have been
deployed to cajole the government for attempting to avoid a takings claim by
redefining property rights. 22 Of course, the fact that government defines and
redefines property all the time, and that government agents have a duty to
draft regulations that try not to unconstitutionally hamper property, does not
seem to quell the ubiquitous narrative that the states "gerrymander the
definition of private property" to somehow unjustifiably defeat a takings
claim.l' The conservatives rarely mention Justice Homes' concession that
12 4
government could hardly go on if it had to pay for every change to the law.
115
116
117
118

Murm, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1950-57 (2017) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
Id at 1954-55 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
Id.at 1956 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
Id at 1955 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
119 449 U.S. 115 (1980).
120 Id at 164.
121 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001). This quote illustrates the competing views of
property rights. Hobbes, like the liberals, saw property rights as positivist creations designed to
benefit the sovereign. Locke, on the other hand, viewed them as natural rights, individual rights
to be precise, the protection of which was a prime purpose of government. See, e.g., Sprankling,
supra note 31, at 66; Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of ConstitutionalProperty, 86 VA. L.
REv. 885, 942-43 (2000).
122 E.g., Loretto, 458 U.S. 419, 439 (1982) (Marshall, J., majority); Philps, 524 U.S. 156, 167
(1998) (Rehnquist, J., majority); Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628 (Kennedy, J., majority); Lucas, 505
U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992) (Scalia, J., majority); Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla Dept. of
Envtl. Prot. (Stop the Beach), 560 U.S. 702, 715 (2010) (Scalia, J., majority); Ruckelshaus, 467
U.S. 986, 1012 (1983) (Blaclmun, J., majority).
123 See Murr, 137 S. Ct at 1956 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
124 Brauneis, supranote 111, at 621.
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Nor do they acknowledge the extent to which landowners manipulate the
25
denominator to manufacture a Lucas claim.'
The conservative narrative envisions government power at odds with
private property, which is usually described as government trying to sneak
'
rights to avoid one. 2
around a takings claim or gerrymandering the property
It also paints property rights as natural rights that precede government and
law.121 Justice Scalia noted in Lucasthat if "the uses of private property were
subject to unbridled, uncompensated qualification under the police power,
'the natural tendency of human nature would be to extend the qualification
2
more and more until at last private property disappear[ed].'"' 8 And the
conservatives point to Pennsylvania Coal, rather than Penn Cenral as the
founding case for the regulatory takings doctrine, thus lending it greater
2
legitimacy through a longer historical pedigree.' 9
Not surprisingly, both of these creation myths are incomplete and
misleading. The liberal narrative misstates the legal history of eminent
domain where there was a rich history of providing compensation for the
3°
mere effects of regulation in the absence of physical appropriation.' Even
Justice Holmes's prophesy that regulation can go too far was not a sudden
burst of inspiration, but a concept that he had addressed on the
3
Massachusetts Supreme Court in eminent domain cases. ' The conservative
narrative misstates the history as well, by glossing over the role of eminent
domain and nuisance in the question of what happens when government
regulation goes too far.'32 The conservatives fail to mention that the real
origins of regulatory takings doctrine, as it is currently divorced from

125 See e.g., Sterk, supra note 81, at 78 (discussing to some extent that Lucas claims are
subject to manipulation by landowners, developers, and municipalities).
126 See, e.g, Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 713 ("States effect a taking if they recharacterize as
public property what was previously private property.").
127 See Van Home's Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (1795) ("[Tlhe right of acquiring and
possessing property, and having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent, and unalienable
rights of man."). This view of natural property rights is reflected in Justice Scalia's "historical
compact" in Luca 505 U.S. at 1028 ("In the case of land, however, we think the notion pressed
by the Council that title is somehow held subject to the 'implied limitation' that the State may
subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsistent with the historical compact
recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional culture.").
128 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014 (quoting Pennsylvania Coa, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
129 See id at 1014-15 (referencing Pennsylvania Goal as the primary case that was built
upon by later cases). Although the conservatives cite to the scholarship that the Just
Compensation Clause was originally interpreted to apply only to physical appropriations, they
view Pennsylvania Coaiasrighting the judicial ship, an expansion of just compensation to cover
regulations because government keeps expanding, threatening to swallow private property
entirely. See Murn, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1956 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("The majority's new
framework compromises the Takings Clause as a barrier between individuals and the press of
the public interest.").
130 See Kobach, supra note 2, at 1215-16, 1218, 1220-22 (discussing Justice Blackmun's
mischaracterization of the history of eminent domain).
131 See discussioninfra Part IV.B.
132 See Kobach, supra note 2, at 1221 (discussing Justice Scalia's incorrect interpretation of

the history of eminent domain).

20191

REQUIEM FOR REGULATORY TAKINGS

eminent domain, originated only forty years ago 33 And the conservatives
quite logically have tried to distance themselves from the nearly twohundred year history of nuisance regulations that did not require
compensation at all when private property was severely hampered or even
destroyed."

It is also clear that federal precedents on the subject are limited and
provide little guidance-in large part because the Fifth Amendment was held
to apply only against federal actions through'most of the nineteenth
century.'33 Until the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment was
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment in 1897, the Barron v. Mayor
and City Council of Balimore' rule prevailed. Barron, of course, held that
the Just Compensation Clause did not apply to state or local actions. 37 But
the character of the case illustrates the errors of both historical narratives,
for landowners had been using a broad definition of take and eminent
domain to challenge non-appropriatory government actions in the 1820s.8
The action in Barron was not a physical appropriation, but rather city
improvements that diverted streams and regraded streets which caused a
build-up of silt and sand in the harbor adjacent to Barron's deep-water
wharf, severely damaging the wharfs value.* Barron's wharf was not
physically appropriated, nor was his land physically invaded.'" Barronwas a
typical case of consequential damages from public works projects, a claim
that was routinely
successful in state courts under the common law of
4
'
domain.1
eminent
Deploying such divergent narratives, the Court continues to issue 5-4
decisions, sometimes favoring the conservative narrative and sometimes
favoring the liberal narrative, most of which strain to fit within any
conceivably rational view of regulatory takings. Cases like Eastern
Enterprisesv. Apfel,3 which ordered compensation for a law that required
coal companies to pay money for health-care benefits;'4 Brown v. Legal

133 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
134 The conservatives rarely cite to the nuisance line of cases, like Mugler v. Kansas,123 U.S.
623 (1887), and Hadacheek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), and when they do it is to
distinguish them, as Justice Scalia did in Lucas,when he said the noxious-use line of cases was
inapposite. See Lucas 505 U.S. at 1023.
135 See, e.g., Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833)
(explaining that the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment was only applicable as a
limitation on the federal government).
136 Id See generallyWmLAM DAVENPORT MERCER, DMINISHING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: BARRON V.
BALTIMORE AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN LIBERTY (2017) (discussing at great length the
legal challenges at both the state and federal levels for applying the Bill of Rights to the states
and the Court's conservative reading of the Just Compensation Clause designed in part to
forestall the social turmoil that would inevitably follow).
137 Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 250-51.
138 See discussion irzfa Part IVA.
139 Barron,32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 243-44.
140 Id
141 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
142

524 U.S. 498 (1998).

143 Id at 514, 538.
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Foundation of Washington,'" which held that, although interest earned on
attorney trust accounts was private property, taking it for public legal
services was not a taking;1" and Home v. DepartmentofAgriculture,'" which
held that confiscating raisins to maintain a thriving raising market was a
47
taking are all examples of how incoherent the doctrine has become.'
The Court is also subject to dramatic jurisprudential swings with its 5-4
decisions. It may decide a ripeness issue and express in dicta that the
government will owe compensation, but then when the case reaches the
Court on the merits a few years later, decide that the government act was
not a taking. l" It opines that landowners may not manufacture takings
claims by severing their property rights and claiming that only the affected
rights are taken, 149 and later it finds that severed property rights are taken
and require compensation. 5°
The differences in judicial ideology regarding the balance of property
rights and government interests are also culprits in the Court's incoherent
doctrine. Until 1987, one could properly say that the Court's approach to
regulatory takings was skeptical, involved ad hoc balancing, and
compensation was ordered only when the government action was quite
unusual. In the nine years between 1978 and 1986, the Supreme Court
decided twenty-one cases involving a potential regulatory taking. 5 Of those,
the Court found no taking on the merits in twelve,"2 and that the issue was
144 538 U.S. 216 (2003).
145 Id. at 240-41.
146 135 S. Ct 2419 (2015).
147

Id at 2430.

ComparePhillips 524 U.S. 156 (1998) (leaving open the issue of whether interest income
generated by funds within an Interest on Lawyer Trust Account (IOLTA), which is appropriated
through a state regulation for legal access programs, is a taking warranting just compensation),
with Brown, 538 U.S. 216 (2003) (holding that earnings resulting from an IOLTA and
appropriated through state regulation is not a regulatory taking requiring just compensation
because there was a zero pecuniary loss), andSuiturn v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S.
725 (1997) (holding the Agency's determination that the petitioner's land was ineligible for
development was a final decision ripe for review, and suggesting a regulatory taking may result
from the diminished value of their Transferable Development Rights), with Tahoe-Sierra, 535
U.S. 302 (2002) (holding that no regulatory taking had occurred by refusing to apply Lucas
finding the rule did not apply to the Agency's moratoria). In both sets of cases, the Court
decided an issue that made commentators certain that the next time around the Court would
order compensation, and then it found a way not to do so. See Philh~ps 524 U.S. at 172; Brown,
538 U.S. at 240-41; Swtum, 520 U.S. at 749-50; Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 333-34.
149 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001); Penn Central, 438 US. 104, 130 (1978) (6-3 split);
Mur, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
150 Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 718 (1987) (unanimous decision); Nollan v. Calif. Coastal
148

Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994).
151 ROBERT MELTZ, TAKINGS DECISIONS OF THE U.S. SUPREME CoURT:. A CHRONOLOGY 8-10

(2015).
152

Penn Central,438 US. at 138; Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67--68 (1979); Prune Yard

Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263
(1980); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation, 452 U.S. 264, 294 (1981); Hodel v. Indiana,
452 U.S. 314, 335 (1981); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 689-90 (1981); Texaco, Inc. v.
Short, 454 U.S. 516, 530 (1982); Kirby Forest Indus. Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 19 (1984);
United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 107 (1985); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475
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not ripe in four more, for a loss rate of 76%.' The Court found a regulatory
M
taking requiring compensation in five of those cases,5
despite the fact that it
had found a regulatory taking requiring compensation in only one prior case:
TM
Arnstrong." One of the five cases, UnitedStates v. Sioux Nation,'
involved
land taken away from the owners through government action and thus really
was an appropriation case. 5 7 And two others involved physical invasion,
which had historically required compensation.'M Only two of the cases could
be described as pure regulatory takings, i.e., regulations that limited use or
devalued property without any physical appropriation and with no
corresponding benefit to the government or the public, and neither involved
land. 59 These two cases are important, however, because they regularized
the hitherto relatively novel claim that regulations affecting property rights
without any physical appropriation or invasion, especially monetary rights
and value, could be subject to judicial review under the Just Compensation
Clause even if not under the Due Process Clause.' 6
If the regulatory takings doctrine was on the runway after 1978, it
finally took flight in 1986 with Justice Scalia's arrival on the bench. Justice
Scalia's first term yielded no fewer than six regulatory takings decisions,
with a noticeably better win-loss ratio.'61 The Court found no taking in three
U.S. 211, 227-28 (1986); Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41,
55-56 (1986); United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982); United States v. Clarke, 445
U.S. 253 (1980).
153 San Diego Gas & Eec., 450 U.S. 621, 633 (1981); Williamson Cty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n
v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 200 (1985); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S.
121, 128 (1985); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Cty. of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 352 (1986).
154 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979); United States v. Sioux Nation of
Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 424 (1980); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,449 U.S. 155, 164-65 (1980);
Loretto, 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982); Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. 986, 1020 (1984).
155 Two of the five cases involved a physical invasion onto the land of another. Loretto, 458
U.S. at 421 (by a cable attached to a landowner's building); KaiserAetna 444 U.S. at 165-66
(invasion by the public when a dredged pond came under the federal navigational servitude).
Thus, extending the doctrine that invasion by government planes, Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 258
(1946), or government directed flood waters, Pumpelly, 8 U.S. 166, 167 (1871), is a form of
appropriation requiring compensation to government permitted cable providers and the public.
A third case, Sioux Nation, involved an 1877 statute that abrogated an earlier treaty protecting
lands for the Sioux Nation, essentially resulting in a loss of lands equivalent to an appropriation.
448 U.S. at 424.
156 448 U.S. at 424.
157 Id
158 Loretto,458 U.S. at 441; KaiserAetn, 444 U.S. at 180.
159 The Court in Ruckelshaus found a patial taking might have happened of some of
respondent Monsanto's pesticide research when it was made available to competitors, in a case
that did not sit easily with the Justices. Ruckeishaus, 467 U.S. at 1020. In Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies,the Court determined that the State of Florida could not appropriate the interest on
a court-ordered escrow account by redefining private property as public property. 449 U.S. at
164. ("[A] State, by ipse dixft may not transform private property into public property without
compensation, even for the limited duration of the deposit in court.").
160 See Ruckleshaus,467 U.S. at 1015-16; Webb's FabulousPharmacies,449 U.S. at 164.
161 Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n v. Fla. Power Corp. (FCC), 480 U.S. 245 (1987); Keystone
Bituminous, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Bowen v. Gillard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987); Hodel, 481 U.S. 704
(1987); Nollan, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cty. of L.A.,
482 U.S. 304 (1987).
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of the cases; ' 6 it found a taking in two cases;1u and the sixth involved a
hypothetical that would plague the Court for years, which is whether
compensation would be due even if the government invalidated the
regulation and removed the restriction.'m Although property rights advocates
lost in three of the 1987 cases, the decisions had significant implications that
moved the jurisprudence toward greater protection of property rights. '"
And if the tide shifted in 1987, the next few years saw the emergence of
a pro-property rights Court with the conservative Clarence Thomas
replacing the liberal Thurgood Marshall in 1991.1m With Justice Thomas's
arrival, Justice Scalia seemed poised to elevate scrutiny of land use
restrictions to intermediate level scrutiny, and to posit a new categorical
rule for loss of all economic value. 67 The decision in Lucas v. South Carolina
162 FCC,480 U.S. at 254 (involving federal regulation of the rent that utilities can charge
cable providers); Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 474-76 (involving an anti-subsidence law
requiring that underground coal be left in place for safety purposes); Bowen, 483 U.S. at 589,
608 (involving amendments to federal welfare program resulting in lower benefits on the ground
that a family has no property right to continued welfare benefits).
163 Hodel,481 U.S. at 718 (involving a federal statute that abrogates the right to descent and
devise of allotted Indian land interests); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841-42 (involving a permit condition
that required a public access easement in exchange for a permit to expand a house).
164 FlstEnglish,482 U.S. at 322 (assuming the County's ordinance had denied the appellant
use of its property, and without payment of a fair value, the invalidation of the ordinance
"would be a constitutionally insufficient remedy").
165 Bowers affirmance of the right to reduce welfare benefits was consistent with
conservative political ideology limiting welfare entitlements and FCC involved two corporate
entities at odds with each other. Bowen, 483 U.S. at 608; FCC,480 U.S. at 247. Only Keystone
Bituminous was a setback for property rights advocates, and ironically it was a near-perfect
reversal of the case that was claimed to have started it all, Pennsylvania Coal. See Keystone
Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 473-74. But that ruling could be justified as a legitimate safety
regulation because subsidence from coal mining posed grave public threats.
The cases that ordered compensation, however, were especially critical to the new property
rights movement Nollan was important because it raised the level of review from rational basis
to intermediate scrutiny in a relatively straightforward permitting case, marking a potential
return to Lochner-era heightened scrutiny. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841. And Hodel v. !-vingbrought
constitutional protections not only to Indian lands, but to severed property rights (the rights to
descent and devise). 481 U.S. at 718. The Court resisted conceptual severance in Penn Centra,
explaining that "'[t]aking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments
and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated."
438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978). Although the Court had rejected conceptual severance in Penn Centra
the Court in Hodel v. Irvingruled that compensation was due when a regulation destroyed two
key sticks in the bundle of property rights. Hode],481 U.S. at 716-18. Moreover, FistEnglish
launched a real bomb into local governments by holding that rescission of an unconstitutional
regulation was an insufficient remedy; compensation might be due as well if the regulation went
too far and the state merely rescinded the law. 482 U.S. at 322. MirstEnglish also brought the
Court full circle back to its blurring of the due process and just compensation lines that
occurred in Pennsylvania Coal, a blurring that has yet to be cleared up. Id at 321-22.
166 Helen Dewar, Senate Confirns Thomas by 52 to 48 to Succeed Marshall on Supreme
CouiZ WASH. POST, Oct 16,1991, at Al.
167 The Court has developed three tiers of scrutiny in equal protection cases-rational basis,
intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny-and two tiers of scrutiny in substantive due process
cases dealing with liberty interests-rational basis and strict scrutiny. Christopher R. Leslie,
The Geography of Equal Protectio, 101 MINN. L REV. 1579, 1584 (2017); 16C C.J.S.
Constitutional Law § 1876. It appears that the Court's treatment of exactions has created an
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Coastal Counci/6 seemed like a sudden brake to government regulators and
a full-blown return to the Lochner-era protections for private property. The
Court held that compensation was required when two beachfront lots were
rendered unbuildable by new coastal erosion regulations following
Hurricane Hugo."9 The 1994 decision in Dolan v. City of 7'gard further
cemented that fear as intermediate scrutiny was affirmed in the common
practice of conditioning permit approvals on land developers giving
something back to the community to compensate for the externalities of
their development activities. 7 °
At the same time, however, Justice Kennedy joined the liberal wing in
denying regulatory takings claims in at least six other cases between 1992
and 2005.1"' While Justice Scalia's ability to play well with others certainly
played a part in the doctrine's growing incoherence,'2 it was also true that
the regulatory takings doctrine, with its questionable constitutional
foundation and its ad hoc nature, has proven to be an unwieldy tool to
reinvigorate constitutional property protections.'7 Between 1988 and 2006,
most regulatory takings cases resulted in a finding that no taking had
occurred. 74 And between 2007 and 2018, the rate of takings cases before the
intermediate level of scrutiny within the Takings Clause that looks an awful lot like elevating
scrutiny under due process. Matthew S. Watson, The Scope of the Supreme Court's Heightened
Scrutiny Takings DoctrineandIts Impact on Development Exactions,20 WHITTIER L. REV. 181,
210 (1998).
168 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
169 Id at 1020,1075.
170 SeeDolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,391 (1994).
171 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Lingle, 544 U.S. 528 (2005); San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City
and Cty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323 (2005); Tahoe-SierrA,535 U.S. 302 (2002); Yee v. City of Escondido,
503 U.S. 519 (1992); Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602
(1993).
172 See Lazarus, supra note 112, at 761.
173 Takings claims have been even less successful in the lower courts, suggesting that judges
at all levels tend to be skeptical of landowner claims and more likely to side with government
than with landowners. In an empirical study of 1700 Lucas claims, which admittedly are hard to
prove, only twenty-seven were successful- Carol Necole Brown & Dwight H. Merriam, On the
Twenty-Fth Anniversary of Lucas: Making or Breaking the Takings Claim, 102 IowA L. REV.
1847, 1849 (2017). This 1.6% success rate suggests that governments are not engaging in so
much unconstitutional behavior that they need to be reined in by the courts. See id. at 1850.
Even if the law places a heavy thumb on the government's side of the scales, such a low success
rate would seem unusual given the political preferences of the judiciary. Assuming half the
judiciary would self-identify as liberal, pro-government judges, the other half would self-identify
as conservative, pro-property-rights judges. With such a balance on the judiciary, a 1.6% success
rate is stunningly low. Add this to the fact that plaintiffs who cannot articulate a Lucas taking
claim-and are stuck with Penn Centralbalancing-face an even more pro-government rule, it
would appear that takings claims are not particularly successful They eat up a lot of judicial
resources for very little return.
174 Although the Court resolved some preliminary ripeness and other procedural issues in
ways that worried government regulators (Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725,
728-29 (1997); Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 160 (1998); San Remo Hotel, 545
U.S. at 341-42; City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687, 698-99 (1999)),
the Court found, no taking in nine cases (Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 4 (1988);
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 301-02 (1989); United States v. Sperry Corp., 493
U.S. 52, 58-59 (1989); Yee, 503 U.S. at 539; Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc., 508 U.S. at 647; Bennis
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Court slowed; it decided only five major takings cases during that time.'
And although three resulted in a finding that compensation was due, those
cases did not make new law.18 Moreover, its most recent case, Murr v.
Wisconsin, dramatically undermines the per se rule of Lucas
77 and may
indicate that the Court is finally weary of its newfangled doctrine.'
These fundamental disagreements in the Justices' ideologies, theories
of property, and their commitment to a constitutional remedy for property
claims have led to the creation of a regulatory taldngs monster. The 1992
decision in Lucas marked the most profound shift toward protecting
property rights and away from the ad hoc exceptionalism that had
characterized the law until then. And scholars bewailed and applauded the
Lucas decision as making new law on the subject.'78 Yet despite the
important changes the decision wrought in the law, those changes have not
yielded the sea change that property rights advocates had hoped. 79 Partly
that is because the other Justices could not fully accept the major change
Justice Scalia tried to implement in traditional nuisance law and the
narrowing of the scope of the police power, ' Oand partly it is because the
doctrine itself cannot be forced to fit into a series of per se rules. For as
v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 453 (1996); Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616; Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332;
Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 240 (2003); Linge, 544 U.S. at 548), and a taking
in only four cases (Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031-32; Dolan,512 U.S. at 383, 396; Babbitt v. Youpee, 519
U.S. 234, 237 (1997)). From 1988 to 2006 the Court went back and forth, often deciding
procedural issues in favor of property owners (Phillips,534 U.S. at 160-63; Suitum, 520 U.S. at
728-29), only to decide the actual takings case on the merits in favor of the government (Brown,
538 U.S. at 240; Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332; Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548). And of the four cases in
which a taking was found, two of them, Dolan and Babbt were essentially relitigating the
same issues as earlier cases, so they added little to the doctrine initially staked out by Scalia in
1987. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 383 (resolving a conflict arising out of the Court's decision in Nolian v.
Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)); Babbitt, 519 U.S. at 237, 243 (upholding the decision
made in Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987)).
175 See generallyMur, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist,
133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013); Ark. Fish & Game Comm'n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23 (2012); Home v.
Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015); Stop the Beac4, 560 U.S. 702 (2010).
176 Koontz, 570 U.S. at 2591 (expanding the Nollan and Dolan exactions to monetary
exactions); Ark. Fish & Game Conm'n, 568 U.S. at 27 (ordering compensation for physical
invasion caused by flooding); Home, 135 S. Ct at 2433 (ordering compensation for physical
appropriation of raisin crop).
177 See discussion infa Part V.C. The addition of two new Justices, Neil Gorsuch and Brett
Kavanaugh, may change this prediction.
178 See generally Cotton Harness, Lucas and the Rebirth of Lochner, 2 S.C. ENVrL L.J. 57
(1992); William F. Funk, Revolution or Restatement? Awaiting Answers to Lucas' Unanswered
Questions, 23 ENVTL. L. 891 (1993); Michael C. Blumm, PropertyMyths, JudicialActivism, and
the Lucas Case, 23 ENVTL L. 907 (1993); Jill Dickey Protos, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council: A Tremor on the Regulatory Takings RichterScale, 43 CASE W. L REv. 669 (1993); E.
Paige Spencer, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Narrow Exception to the Taldngs
Clause,3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 639 (1993); Richard Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin"on Lucas,
45 SWAN. L. REv. 1411 (1993); Todd D. Brody, Examining the Nuisance Exception to the Takings
Clause: Is There Life for EnvironmentalRegulationsAterLucas , 4 FoRDHAM ENVrL L.REv. 287
(1993).
179 See Brown & Merriam, supra note 173, at 1849 (finding that only 27 out of 1700 Lucas
claims were successful).
180 See Lazarus, supranote 112, at 823.
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Justice Holmes reminds us, "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying
for every such change in the general law."''8' Balancing private property
rights and the public welfare is virtually impossible when the Justices cannot
agree on the character of private property, the constitutional standard upon
which to judge government effects on property, or the propriety of
regulatory takings.
B. JusticeScaha "sDiscursiveMove to Undermine TraditionalNuisanceLaw
Justice Scalia further accelerated the incoherence in regulatory takings
doctrine in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, when he derided the
traditional common law distinctions between benefit-conferring and harmavoidance under traditional nuisance law, a post-modem move that implied
that government regulation-and judicial review-are mere semantics." For
hundreds of years, the law of nuisance had provided limits to land uses that
interfered with the property rights of neighbors.'9 When legislation
attempted to accomplish the same ends, the courts generally permitted the
same harms to befall landowners without requiring compensation as they
had under private nuisance litigation.'m Thus, land-use restrictions that
avoided nuisances were deemed to be non-compensable, even if land was
rendered valueless thereby.
But in Lucas, Justice Scalia claimed that there was no real distinction
between harm-prevention and benefit-conferring legislation. As he
explained:
The transition from our early focus on control of "noxious" uses to our
contemporary understanding of the broad realm within which government may
regulate without compensation was an easy one, since the distinction between
"harm-preventing" and "benefit-conferring" regulation is often in the eye of the
beholder. It is quite possible, for example, to describe in either fashion the
ecological, economic, and esthetic concerns that inspired the South Carolina
Legislature in the present case. One could say that imposing a servitude on
Lucas's land is necessary in order to prevent his use of it from "harming" South

181 Pennsylvania Co4 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
182 See Lucas,505 U.S. 1003, 1024, 1026 (1992).

183 Id. at 1022-23 (citing cases from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in
which states used their police powers to enjoin conduct on private property that amounted to
public nuisances).
184 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69, 678 (1887); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 123, 12526, 130 (1876); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 404-05, 412 (1915); and Miller v. Schoene,
276 U.S. 272, 277, 279-80 (1928) were all cases where the court denied compensation for
property that was destroyed (Miet), rendered valueless (Mugler, Hadachec),or dramatically
devalued (Munn). Without directly overruling these precedents, Justice Scalia called into
question their logic and called into question government claims that regulations were aimed at
preventing private property owners from using their property to inflict harm on others.
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Carolina's ecological resources; or, instead, in order to achieve the "benefits" of
an ecological preserve.la
This idea that harm-prevention and benefit-conferring are simply in the eye
of the beholder implies that government regulation is always illegitimatei.e., always overstepping and infringing property rights-and that when the
government claims a legitimate harm-prevention motive, the Court should
discount its justification as gerrymandering to avoid a takings claim.
However, courts had relied for nearly two centuries on the distinction
between harm-prevention and benefit-conferring to help distinguish between
land-use laws that prevented public harms and were therefore permissible
under due process, and those that merely imposed harms to benefit the
public generally, which would require an exercise of eminent domain.'
Eliding these distinctions, Justice Scalia's discursive move untethered
regulatory takings from any balancing between private and public interests
and treated as equivalent the interests of landowners who pollute and those
who don't want to suffer the effects of a neighbor's pollution. Although
Justice Blackmun strongly criticized this move in his dissent in Lucas,1 7 the
decision fatally undermined the Court's long history of nuisance law. The
post-modem move may be right in some abstract theoretical sense, but in
the world of competing land use regulation, the discursive move was terribly
consequential. And it is wrong. Of course there is a difference between
stating that a law preventing you from hitting me in the nose with your fist is
harm-prevention (which it is) or is benefit-conferring (which it is not)
because I have every right not to be assaulted. The actions are not morally
equivalent and it is dangerous to treat them as such.
It is true that harm-prevention and benefit-conferring assume an apriori
status quo. Undeveloped land for many decades was considered a nuisance
to neighbors who had expended great effort into wresting land from the
natural elements and cultivating it to grow crops.ln Weeds on undeveloped
adjoining land could produce seeds that blew onto the cultivated land, it
harbored animals that devastated crops, and it was unsightlyLn But it would
be very unusual to regard doing nothing on land as creating a nuisance. On
the other hand, the landowner who built a cement plant that spewed dust,
the slaughterhouse that emitted odors, and the shopping mall that
introduces more traffic and crime are all actions that impose harms on
neighboring lands. There are externalities to all land uses and land
development. But only in some Coasian world of abstract post-modern
economics is there a moral equivalent between stopping the landowner
185 Lucas, 505

U.S. at 1024.
186 See Halper, supra note 92. Justice Holmes, when he served on the Massachusetts
Supreme Court, however, held that a regulation limiting the height of buildings around the
Boston State House conferred a benefit that would require compensation. See Parker v.
Commonwealth, 178 Mass. 199, 205-06 (1901).
187 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1060-61.
188 See Joe Gelt, Abandoned Farmland Often is Troubled Land in Need of Restoration (Aug.,
1993) (unpublished manuscript), https://perna.cc/58UU-ZRUL.
189 Id
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whose development on the beach exacerbates erosion and threatens
neighboring homes, and the landowner who insists that he should be
compensated if he is not allowed to impose harms on his neighbors on the
grounds that by not building he is imposing some benefit.
Furthermore, when Justice Scalia held in Lucas that any regulation that
deprived property of 100% of its value must be compensated unless its uses
could be constrained under traditional private nuisance doctrine, he
undermined the exception to his own categorical rule.'°As he put it, a
law or decree with such an effect [depriving land of all value] must, in other
words, do no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in
the courts-by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under
the State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary
power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.'
His background principles of property law and nuisance ultimately elevated
property rights to unchanging, absolute rights that were supposedly fixed on
some particular date and could not be modified later without compensation
unless the landowner sought to engage in a nuisance.
The nuisance exception, combined with the elision of harm-prevention
and benefit-conferring, seriously undermined the validity of the public
interest in the regulatory takings calculus. As Professor Louise Halper
explained, Scalia's move in Lucas"reduces the police power to no more than
the extension to the commons of the rule of sic utere. The legislature's role
in land use is limited to codifying the common law of private disputes. " 192 By
limiting legislative action in Lucas to codifying only those restrictions on
land that could already be accomplished through private nuisance disputes,
Justice Scalia eliminated the legislature's long-standing ability to choose
between different private uses based on its judgment of the public interest. It
also "strip[ped] the legislature of the police power, an attribute of
sovereignty, by claiming that the public interest which the police power
doctrinally protects does not exist as a formal entity.'93
And by requiring compensation for all legislation with a negative effect
on property unless it regulates nuisances, Justice Scalia reduced the police
power to advance the public welfare into a narrow, nuisance-avoidance role
only. He explained:

190 After deriding the harm/benefit distinction and asserting that there was no normative
difference between different land uses, and that nuisance was semantic nonsense, he then later
articulated his categorical rule that if 100/6 of the economic value of property is wiped out, then
compensation is automatically due unlessthe proscribed uses were not part of the title to begin
with. He explained that the limitations on title "must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions
that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land
ownership." Lucas 505 U.S. at 1029.
191 Id

192 Halper, supranote 92, at 337.
193 Id.
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The "harmful or noxious uses" principle was the Court's early attempt to
describe in theoretical terms why government may, consistent with the Takings
Clause, affect property values by regulation without incurring an obligation to
compensate-a reality we nowadays acknowledge explicitly with respect to the
full scope of the State's police power.... "Harmful or noxious use" analysis
was, in other words, simply the progenitor of our more contemporary

statements that "land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it 'substantially
advance[s] legitimate state interests. ' ""4
Unfortunately, Justice Scalia's discursive move collapsed the nuisance
analysis into one about the legitimacy of the government's objectives
supporting the regulations. This sleight of hand means that government can
regulate only if it substantiallyadvances a legitimate state interest (which
heightens scrutiny in property cases), and if the regulation destroys all
economic value then the justification of the state interest can be no more
than nuisance abatement.
With the semantic elision of the noxious use analysis, Justice Scalia not
only untethered regulatory takings doctrine from a very long line of nuisance
cases, he laid the foundation for the Court's eventual elimination of the
police power justification element altogether from regulatory takings
calculations. Thus, in cases involving only partial harms, the state's interest
must be substantial to withstand a regulatory takings challenge, whereas
before Lucas the focus was on whether the state was reasonably avoiding
harms caused by conflicting or harmful uses. 19 5 And if the regulatory harm is
a total wipeout, then compensation will be due in all cases unless the
regulated activity constituted a nuisance under traditional sic utere
balancing.' 96 For partial harms the state must have a really good reason for
what it is doing, not merely balancing the benefits and burdens of economic
life; for total harms the state can regulate only if the landowner is engaging
in uses that cause a nuisance. 1 7 But in his semantic move, he argued that
there really is not any nuisance because harms and benefits are morally
equivalent.198

Yet nothing stands still in the world of regulatory taldngs. Although this
claim that noxious use analysis has been superseded by an analysis of the
legitimacy of the state's interest test might accurately have described the
Court's jurisprudence between 1992 and 2005, the Court's decision in Lingle
v. Chevron USA, removing the state interest test, leaves us without any
reference to the public goals of regulation.'9 After Lingle, there is essentially
nothing on the government's side to balance.

194 Lucas,505 U.S. at 1022-23, 1024 (citing Nolan,483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987)).
195 Id at 1030-32; Penn Central,438 U.S. 104, 124-26 (1978).
196 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-31.
197 Id.at 1023-24, 1029-32.
198 Id at 1024-26.

199 See Lingle, 544 U.S. 528, 540, 548 (2005) (concluding that whether or not a law
substantially advances a legitimate state interest is no longer a valid takings test, thus removing
the test that considered the government's regulatory goals).

2019]

REQUIEM FOR REGULATORY TAKINGS

C Lochner, Lingle, and the Revival ofSubstantive Economic Due Process
Another point of incoherence lies in the debate over what role the
government's interest should play in the regulatory takings calculus. After
Justice Scalia's elision of nuisance law and his rejection of the police power
justification within the takings test, the only factor left that matters is the
effect of the regulation on private property. But that is not what ad hoc
balancing was supposed to mean. The liberals consistently argue that
balancing means there needs to be something on the government's side of
the scale. 2n Unfortunately, unless the Court simply assumes the government
interest is always valid, any concerted analysis of the public interest begins
to look an awful lot like heightened due process review.201 And reconciling
that conundrum seems to have made things arguably even worse.
As discussed earlier, many scholars agree that a large contributor to the
rise of regulatory takings doctrine, and the heightened scrutiny that the
Court has imposed on certain types of economic regulation, was the demise
of substantive economic due process in 19 3 7 .2o2 The Due Process Clause has
had a rocky history. 23 For over a century after the founding, the Due Process
Clause was interpreted to require certain procedural safeguards when laws
inhibited property rights; it generally did not purport to dictate the
substance of any formal laws or prohibit laws that arguably were passed
legitimately under the police power.2 4 During a period between the 1890s
and 1937, however, the Supreme Court struck down hundreds of laws under
a strict natural rights theory of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. ° In these cases, the Court treated property and
contract rights as fundamental and viewed police power regulations that
limited those rights with skepticism. Unless there was a clear public health,
safety, or morals justification for a law that negatively affected economic
rights, the Court would strike it down as beyond the legitimate scope of the

See, e.g., Lucas,505 U.S. at 1046-47 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Considering the public interest in ad hoc balancing is different from intermediate level
review of the government's justification, but the AginsLinge experiment shows how hard it is
to keep these two considerations separate. See Mark Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of
Regulatory Takings, 28 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 525, 528-29, 535-36 (2009).
200
201

202

See, e.g., Byrne, supranote 66, at 474-75.

203 The Due Process Clause is believed to derive from the English "law of the land" provision

in the Magna Carta, which limited governmental overreaching by requiring that any laws
reducing certain property and liberty rights be done according to the law of the land. See Ryan
C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 428 (2010).
For nearly a century in the U.S., the Due Process Clause was interpreted broadly to mean that
so long as legislation was passed according to the proper procedure and did not violate certain
fundamental natural rights, the legislation satisfied due process. Id. at 454, 457. It certainly had
a procedural element to it that required proper procedure be followed in the promulgation of
laws, as well as in the application of laws to individuals. People were not to be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without proper notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id at 453.
204 See Barros, supra note 49, at 475-84.
205 Typical cases cited for this period are Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Hammer
v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); and Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
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As the Court

It must, of course, be conceded that there is a limit to the valid exercise of the
police power by the State. There is no dispute concerning this general
proposition. Otherwise the Fourteenth Amendment would have no efficacy and
the legislatures of the States would have unbounded power, and it would be
enough to say that any piece of legislation was enacted to conserve the morals,
the health or the safety of the people; ... In every case that comes before this
court, therefore, where legislation of this character is concerned and where the
protection of the Federal Constitution is sought, the question necessarily arises:
Is this a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police power of the
State, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the
right of the individual to his personal liberty or to enter into those contracts in
relation to labor which may seem to him appropriate or necessary...?...
By elevating the level of scrutiny on economic legislation, the Court
refused to defer to legislative claims that a law promoted health or safety;
instead, the Court analyzed the evidence on its own and replaced the
legislature's judgment about the wisdom of the legislation with its own. By
striking down countless laws in the name of a robust theory of property and
contract rights, the Court precipitated a constitutional crisis that prompted
President Roosevelt's court-packing plan, a plan to replace every Justice
over age seventy who failed to retire with a new liberal Justice who would
be more sympathetic to government regulation.2 °s Ultimately the plan failed,
but the Court got the message." The Supreme Court never again ruled that
any economic legislation violated the Due Process Clause after its decision
in Morehead,on June 1, 1936.210 And to this day, the accusation of reviving
Lochnerism reminds the Justices that an activist Court can be hamstrung if it
fails to recognize the direction of the political winds. As Professor Benjamin
Barros has noted, during the Lochner period the meaning of the police
power was severely narrowed, allowing state governments to pass only
health and safety laws with strictly defined
11 public benefits, rather than
generalized laws with diffuse public impact.

206

See, e.g., Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53-56.

207 Id at 45, 56.
208 Justice Owen J. Roberts, who had frequently voted with the conservative Justices during
the 1920s and 1930s to strike down economic legislation, voted with the liberals in West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), in what proved to be an epic reversal of property rights
protections under the Due Process Clause and the interstate commerce power. Although many
attributed his switch to pressure from President Roosevelt to pack the Court by adding six new
Justices, scholars generally recognize that the causation explanation is too simplistic. See, e.g.,
BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION 67 (1998); MARIAN C. McKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT
CONSTITUTIONAL WAR: THE COURT-PACKING CRISIS OF 1937, at 560-62 (2002).
209 See CUSHMAN, supranote 208, at 67 (calling Roosevelt's court-packing plan "ill-fated").
210 Morehead v. People, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).

211 Barros, supranote 49, at 489-90.
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As scholars have noted, the demise of substantive economic due
process has resulted in a level of scrutiny of land-use regulations that
ironically is even more deferential than the standard of arbitrary and
capricious.2 2 Regulations have to be "truly irrational," produce "grave
unfairness," have "no conceivable rational relationship" to the ends sought,
or must "shock the conscience"2 3 to violate the Due Process Clause.2 4 But as
scholars have also noted, in its fear of reviving Lochnerism by reinvigorating
due process review, the Court has heightened scrutiny of economic
legislation under the doctrine of regulatory takings instead, thus further
confounding the logic of the Just Compensation Clause.2 5 Numerous
commentators, as well as Justice Kennedy, see a benefit to at least a slightly
more robust level of due process review rather than using the Just
Compensation Clause to provide the check. 2 ' As Professor Ronald
Krotoszynski so eloquently wrote:
The mere invocation of public safety must not serve as a shibboleth that
precludes any meaningful judicial inquiry into the real intent and effect of the
regulation at issue. Wrapping a de facto expropriation in the cellophane
wrapper of a police power enactment should not preclude a property owner
from obtaining 'just compensation' from the government. At the same time,
however, the federal courts must not deploy the Takings Clause in a fashion
that risks resurrecting the long-discredited doctrine of Lochner v. New York.2"
The problem with the heightened scrutiny that the conservative majority has
deployed in regulatory takings cases is that it is remarkably similar to the
same Lochner-erareview that the Court simultaneously eschews.
Like Hamlet's mother, who doth protest too much, the conservative
members of the Court routinely elevate scrutiny, second-guess legislatures,
and denounce the expertise of regulatory agencies, striking down economic
legislation, all while loudly disavowing the Lochner-erajudicial activism that8
accomplished the same goal using the Due Process Clause a century ago. 2
This came to a head in Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc. in 2005.29 The problems
had begun twenty-five years earlier, in 1980, when the Court had articulated
a slightly different test than Penn Central balancing in Agins v. City of
TYburon.ss The Agins two-part test would require compensation if a
regulation "does not substantially advance legitimate state interests... or
212 Byrne, supranote 66, at 477; Krotoszynsld, supranote 98.
213 Byrne, supranote 66, at 9.
214 City of Cuyahoga,538 U.S. 188 (2003).
215 Krotoszynski, supra note 98; Nollan, 483 U.S. 825, 844-46 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(critiquing the Court for requiring a stricter, due process style fit); Dolan, 512 U.S. 374, 410
(1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
216 The Court's decision in Eastern EnteIprses v. Apfel raised this issue directly. 524 U.S.
498, 545 (1998); see also Wolf, supranote 99, at 1360--63, 1377-79; Thomas Colby & Peter Smith,
The Return of Lochner,100 CoRNELL L REv. 527, 596 (2015).
217 Krotoszynski, supranote 98, at 718-19.
218 Id at 717; see also Harness,suprnnote 178, at 70.

219 Linge, 544 U.S. 528, 544 (2005).
220 See 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
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denies an owner economically viable use of his land."2' Justice Powell,
writing for the majority in Agns, cited Nectow v. Cambridge, 2 a due process
case from 1928, for the first point, and Penn Centralfor the second. The
Agins test, unfortunately, blended due process and regulatory takings
explicitly through the substantally advance test, leading to confusion
Moreover, the term
compounded in subsequent takings cases.'
"substantially advance" in the Agins test clearly denoted a higher level of
scrutiny than the "rationally related" means/end fit of rational basis due
224
process review. This heightening of review and merging of due process in
regulatory takings led many to criticize the Court, especially its decision in
EasternEnterprisesv. Apfel.m
After much hand-wringing, in 2005, the Court expressly rejected the
first prong of the Agins test in Lingle v. Chevron USA,2 6 noting that the
government's interest is a due process consideration and not a takings
consideration. Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous court, noted that
the substantially advances formula
has some logic in the context of a due process challenge, for a regulation that
fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective may be so arbitrary or
irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process Clause.... But such a test is not
a valid method of discerning whether private property has been "taken" for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment.'
The decision in Lingle put the Court's proverbial foot down on what had
become an unwieldy revival of substantive due process in the regulatory
taldngs context. The Court had heightened scrutiny of the government's
justification in many takings cases, and it had also begun to treat property
rights as fundamental, deserving of heightened review whenever they were
infringed or regulated. As Justice O'Connor explained:
Finally, the "substantially advances" formula is not only doctrinallyuntenable
as a takings test-its application as such would also present serious practical
difficulties. The Agins formula can be read to demand heightened means-ends
review of virtually any regulation of private property. If so interpreted, it would
require courts to scrutinize the efficacy of a vast array of state and federal
regulations-a task for which courts are not well suited. Moreover, it would
empower-and might often require-courts to substitute their predictive
judgments for those of elected legislatures and expert agencies.... We find the
proceedings below remarkable, to say the least, given that we have long

Id.
277 U.S. 183 (1928).
See Ains, 447 U.S. at 260.
Rational basis review usually requires that the challenger show the law does not "bear[] a
rational relation to a constitutionally permissible objective." Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,
733 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
225 See Wolf, supranote 99, at 1356, 1361; Krotoszynsld, supranote 98, at 720.
226 544 U.S. 528, 532 (2005).
227 Id at 542 (citations omitted).
221
222
223
224
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eschewed such heightened scrutiny when addressing substantive due process
challenges to government regulation.2
The Court's unanimous rejection of the Agins "substantially advances"
formula purported to establish a bright line, once again, between regulatory
takings and due process. Unfortunately, however, the Court did not reverse
the heightened scrutiny that the Agins substantially advance formula had
wrought in the exactions cases of Nollan and Dolan,2n claiming that
"[ajlthough Nolan and Dolan quoted Agins language, the nile those
decisions established is entirely distinct from the 'substantially advances'
test we address today." ° By failing to reverse the heightened scrutiny of
Nollan and Dolan, on the grounds that they did not explicitly use the Agins
test, the Court kept alive the confounding heightened due process review in
the exactions cases.
By drawing a bright line between due process and regulatory takings,
however, the Court maintains the illusion that regulatory takings is a
coherent constitutional doctrine with independent jurisprudential standing.
But while many commentators applauded the Court for finally clearing up
the due process/regulatory takings confusion that the Agins test had created,
it seems to me that the Lingle decision is problematic on numerous grounds.
First, as a unanimous decision, it makes one wonder why both the propertyrights conservatives and the pro-government liberals would agree to remove
the substantially advances formula from the Court's regulatory takings
doctrine. Something was afoot. The liberals were perhaps happy because it
undermined Agins altogether, where the other prong of the Agins test had
provided the precedent for the disastrous per se test of Lucas.21 They
perhaps hoped that Lucas could be overruled as well. Although that hasn't
happened explicitly, I argue below that it did essentially happen with the
Court's 2017 decision in Murr.
The liberals perhaps were also happy because it made explicit what
many had been complaining about: the revival of Lochnernsm in the guise of
regulatory takings. But acknowledging the sleight of hand and then rejecting
it ultimately left regulatory takings lopsided. Without any place for an
explicit analysis of the legitimacy of the state's actions, regulatory takings
has become solely about impact on the private property owner without any
reference to the importance of the state's interest. 2n Perhaps for that reason
the conservatives were happy with Lingle. By eschewing the substantially
228 Id at 544-45.
229 There is no question that the Court elevated scrutiny in the case of exactions, using a test
that requires compensation if the exaction is not "reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a
substantial government purpose," and that there be an "essential nexus" between the legitimate
state interests and the permit condition. Id at 834; Dolan,512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994).
230 Lingle, 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005) (citations omitted).
231 Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 1016, 1024 (1992) (citing Aginsas the basis for its decision).
232 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
233 This is a move the property rights movement had been advocating for decades. See, e.g.,
Horne 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 (2015) (quoting Leonard v. Early,155 Md. 252, 258 (1928) on how

types of private property are not "public things subject to the absolute control of the state").
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advance formula, they could settle down to focusing solely on the impact of
the regulation. Without the state's interest to balance on the other side,
regulations look far worse when we only look to the impact. Removing the
state's interest also reinforced Justice Scalia's elision of harm-avoidance and
benefit-conferring by focusing solely on regulatory harms to private property
without any reference to the public harms being avoided or to the owner's
actions that made herself vulnerable to the purported harms of the
regulation.2
While many scholars have bewailed the incoherence of the Court's
regulatory takings doctrine, and a few have tried to offer ways to reconcile
the cases under a somewhat consistent set of principles, by the time of Murr
in 2017, most had given up.m Scholars that sided with the liberal wing
thought regulatory takings was on its way out with Palazzolo and Tahoem
Sierra, but then along came Koontz, Stop-the-Beach, and Home. The
conservative wing and its supporters hoped these cases presaged a
reinvigoration of natural property rights doctrine and heightened protection
m
despite San Remo, Lingle, and Yee.' But then came Murr which, as I argue
below, has fatally eroded Lucas, the lodestar in the conservative pantheon of
takings cases. The Court cannot seem to make up its mind whether to evict
the constitutional interloper of regulatory takings, or open the door and
welcome it in. And while the Court cannot decide, the feedback loop
continues to grow stronger and more incoherent. In the face of the Court's
seeming paralysis, I would like to suggest that maybe a third way can be
found-one that does a better job balancing government overreaching with
landowner gamesmanship, that puts the environment first so we have a
viable future, and resists government gerrymandering: reclaiming eminent
domain.
IV. A WAY FORWARD
When we look at the fundamental philosophical differences between
the liberal and conservative wings on the Court, and we see how those
differences have resulted in the incomprehensible regulatory takings
doctrine of today, we can perhaps find a third path forward. Instead of
viewing regulatory takings as an independent constitutional doctrine,
existing in the liminal space between due process and eminent domain,
perhaps we can build on the flexible common law to bring due process and
234 See Danaya C. Wright, A New Time for Denominators: Toward A Dynamic Theory of
Property in Regulatory Takings' Relevant Parcel Analis, 34 ENVTL. L. 175, 175-178 (2004)
(arguing that actions landowners take prior to the imposition of regulations that provide
benefits but make them more vulnerable to regulatory harms should be considered in
determining the denominator of the takings fraction).
235 See, e.g., Wolf supranote 99, at 1356, 1361.
236 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606, 631-32 (2001); Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302, 342 (2002);
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2603 (2013); Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. 702, 715 (2010); Home, 135 S. Ct.
at 2433.
237 San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. 323, 347-38 (2005); Lingle, 544 U.S. 528, 532 (2005); Yee v. City
of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 539 (1992).
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eminent domain together. Doing so would squeeze out the incoherent and
illegitimate doctrine of regulatory takings that rests on conflicting notions of
private property and competing definitions of the police power. And it would
require not so much a full-scale reversal and repudiation of regulatory
takings, but rather an embracing of the doctrine's common law roots and a
return to Justice Holmes's fateful words in Penn Coalthat a regulation that
goes too far requires an act of eminent domain to sustain it. 2 8 Moreover, if
we pay heed to our Lochner-era history, we should reject regulatory takings
as the twenty-first century substantive economic due process. And as the
Court did with the one,. so it should do with the other: return to a more
positivist understanding of property rights, reject heightened scrutiny, and
return regulatory takings to its eminent domain origins.
I am not the first to suggest that the Court should return to a more
traditional form of eminent domain to resolve its regulatory takings
quandary. Professor Jed Rubenfeld very cogently has argued that the Court
should focus on regulations that cause private property to be put to a public
use before compensation should be required.23 Thus, when private property
is actually used for a public benefit, like seams of coal supporting public
streets, then compensation should be due, but not when regulations simply
prohibit certain desired uses of private property which do not directly
benefit the public.2 ° And Professor Ronald Krotoszyinski argues that
compensation should be due only when government acts with expropriatory
inten4 i.e., that government action for which a landowner seeks
24
compensation must be "tantamount to an eminent domain action." '
I would like to build off the work of these scholars but go further and
suggest that the government must actually exercise eminent domain and in
fact appropriate the property if compensation is to be paid. If regulations do
not affect a cognizable property right, one that can be appropriated through
eminent domain, then damages might be due, but not compensation under
the Takings Clause. 2 Part of the regulatory takings incoherence has been a
blurring of the line between compensation and damages, a line that should
28 PennsylvaniaCoa, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
239 Rubenfeld, supranote 26, at 1080.
240 Id."
241 See Krotoszynski, supra note 98, at 719. Kris

Kobach has also argued that regulatory
takings has its origins in state eminent domain law. See Kobach, supranote 2, at 1229-34.
242 There is a complicated distinction between compensation and damages that I won't go
into in depth here. Suffice it to say that even the Court has trouble. See, e.g., Williamson Cty.
Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 197 (1985); Swtum, 520 U.S. 725, 734
(1997); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687, 710 (1999). Logically,
compensation is due when property is appropriated and damages are due when a property
owner suffers additional damages from the appropriation. Williamson Cty. Reg'l Planning
Comm'h 473 U.S. at 197. So in a partial taking, where only a portion of land is appropriated, a
landowner is compensated for the land appropriated, and then paid damages for any
consequential damages accruing to his retained land from the appropriation. See discussion
inr Part IV.A. But one of the conundrums of regulatory takings is that the limitations of
regulations are usually not an appropriation of a cognizable property right or physical items, but
rather limitations on use that more accurately resemble the consequential damages actions of
the nineteenth century. Id
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be reestablished. And in the event of either condemnation or a damages
action, we should also return to the era in which benefits from government
action are offset against the harms, thus more accurately applying the
reciprocity of advantage that Justice Holmes invoked when he said that
government could hardly go on if to some extent private property could not
be infringed. 24 That give and take is a necessary price of living in a modem
society with all of the benefits of courts, police, and the administrative state
that protects and privileges property of all sorts. 2"
2
Traditional eminent domain jurisprudence recognized this. 4 Going
back to a more robust understanding of eminent domain will necessitate a
rejection of the natural rights theory of property that is the hallmark of the
conservative wing of the Court with its penchant for per se takings rules.
Going back to eminent domain will also require consideration of the public
use or public purpose behind governmental actions, thus necessitating a
rejection of the Court's decision in Lingle. Eminent domain also requires that
government appropriate a cognizable property right, a requirement that may
help break down some of the confusion between the police power and
regulatory takings.2" The hundreds of class-action cases challenging the
railbanking statute provides an excellent example of how the Court's current
regulatory takings jurisprudence has created serious confusion in the lower
courts and thereby imposed liability for regulations that do not actually take
any cognizable property right.247 And finally, in true eminent domain fashion,
the courts need to be able to offset benefits and advantages from the
purported regulatory harms as was customary with the major infrastructure
improvements of the nineteenth century.
I outline the basic contours of my argument below and conclude with a
discussion of how a more robust notion of eminent domain would solve
most, if not all, of the Court's incoherent cases.
A EminentDomain Has a Long Recordof Balancingthe PolicePowerand
I'vateProperty
The first step to realigning takings law is to remember Justice Holmes's
entire passage in Penn Coal regarding regulations that go too far. The full
passage reads:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation
and must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must
have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for

243
244

See Pennsylvania Co

YALE L.J. 547, 549-51 (2001).
245

246
247

260 U.S. at 415.

See Torres, supra note 26, at 13; Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111
See discussion supra PartII.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
See discussion of railbanking issues Lzfra Part IV.D.
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consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution. When
it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.m
When Justice Holmes later states that "if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking,"2 9 he is surely referring to the passage above that
requires an exercise of eminent domain when the effects of the regulation
are sufficiently significant. The linkage between compensation and eminent
domain is a story that is completely lost in the two traditional narratives of
regulatory takings. Thus, to the extent eminent domain can play a role in
bringing rationality to regulatory takings, the discursive move of ignoring
Justice Holmes's admonition to exercise eminent domain has resulted in
further untethering regulatory takings from its logical origins in eminent
domain and just compensation.
Philip Nichols explains that the law of eminent domain was not limited
to physical appropriation, but could be triggered by the effect of
regulations. ° In the 1917 edition of his treatise on Eminent Domain, Nichols
explains that:
There is nothing on the face of the constitutional provision in question which
confines its application to a taking of property under color of eminent domain,
and, although it was undoubtedly specifically aimed at the power of eminent
domain, it nevertheless applies to all the sovereign powers of government
which may be used to interfere with the quiet enjoyment of private property;
but in its application to powers other than eminent domain it must be
construed in the light of the universal understanding of the people when the
constitutions were adopted that the participation in the protection and other
benefits which an organized government affords is the only compensation to
which an individual is entitled for the interference with certain of his property
rightS.25

These certainpropertyrightsthat may be interfered with without a duty
of compensation include taking of property in time of war or other calamity,
taking under the power of taxation, the requirement of personal services
(like the draft), restrictions under the police power in regulations affecting
the public health, morals, or safety, and in certain circumstances in

248 PennsylvaniaCoal,260 U.S. at 413.
?49 Id at 415.
250 Nichols was quite skeptical of the hyper-protections of private property rights that he
saw in the first decades of the twentieth century, protections we associate with Lochnerism.
NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 45. He blames this on the rise of an elected judiciary that would seek
to please private interests, and the concomitant loss of an independent judiciary, with
heightened private property protections that he viewed came at the cost of the public good. Id.
at 45-46. Thus, while he saw the heightened protections of private property as a move away
from the original constitutional balance inherent in the Just Compensation and Due Process
Clauses, he did not take the position that regulation could never work a taking. Id. at 261. He
saw Lochnerism as a move away from the constitutional balance of private property and public
welfare, but he also did not limit eminent domain to physical appropriations. Id
251 Id.at 262.
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regulations passed for the public welfare.m Regulations of the latter sort
were the most open to challenge. m Nichols distinguishes between those
public welfare regulations that require compensation and those that do not,
as follows:
In substance then, the prevailing doctrine seems to be that a general regulation
which is not a mere meddlesome interference with the private affairs of
individuals and which has some realpublcpurpose behind it and bears a direct
relation to the enhancement of the public welfare, may constitutionally be
permitted to interfere with the manner in which private property is used
without a right to compensation arising; but unless such a regulation is enacted
in behalf of the public health, morals or safety, it is not within the power of a
state to apply it so as to deprive an owner of an ordinary, natural and
remunerativeuse of his property without compensation.m
Nichols's articulation of the relation between eminent domain and the
police power, coming at the end of the nineteenth century, is remarkably
prescient.m Before wide-scale zoning, environmental laws, and historic
preservation laws, the vast growth of urban and industrial development,
along with the large-scale development of transportation infrastructure in
the form of railroads and highways, gave plenty of scope for refining the
distinction between regulations that go so far as to require an exercise of
eminent domain, and those that merely balance the benefits and burdens of
modem life.
There is no question that state courts had developed a coherent and
generally sophisticated jurisprudence of eminent domain law that
recognized nuanced property rights and that some governmental actions
required an exercise of eminent domain even though the government did not
initially seek to appropriate the property.m Some of those cases fit within

Id at 262-63, 270-71, 276.
Id at 276.
Id at 279 (emphasis added).
255 But according to Nichols, pressure grew throughout the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century to grant property rights greater protections through eminent domain and due
process. Some of the ways the nineteenth century courts veered off course, according to
Nichols, include:
252
253
254

the existence of private property rights in land which the public has acquired in fee; the
doctrine that the rights of the public in a public highway are not as extensive in the rural
districts as in a city; the doctrine that when part of a tract of land is taken the public
cannot set off benefits to the remaining land from the value of the land taken, and the
doctrine that the payment of compensation cannot be made conditional upon the
institution of proceedings by the owner.
Id at 46-47.
256 Id at 272-73 ("When injury, is inflicted upon the value of a particular piece of real estate
as an incident of a general regulation of a restrictive character, enacted in behalf of the public
health, safety or morals, the courts are slow to consider such injury a taking of property for
public use requiring compensation, and the same view is taken of a regulation enacted for
similar objects which requires an actual outlay of money by property owners, such as an
ordinance requiring the owners of tenement houses to equip them with fire escapes, or with
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traditional private or public nuisance law while others recognized that
government actions could negatively affect private property without being
taken for public use or requiring compensation.2 5 7 At the same time, other
cases required compensation for mere regulations that caused physical
invasion, destruction of property, and even devaluation of property.25
Moreover, few states had just compensation requirements in their state
constitutions, so most relied on the developing common law and notions of
natural justice to require compensation when private property was taken for
public use.29 State judges referred to "law of the land" provisions,
Blackstone, Grotius, or Pufendorf, to protect private property from being
taken without compensation or from being taken for a private use.ns The
power of eminent domain, therefore, was of long-standing recognition and
acceptance. And it had proved flexible enough to handle the technological
expansion and public infrastructure developments of the nineteenth century.
As Nichols explains, there was little question that compensation would
be required when private property was appropriated directly or was
destroyed by government action from the early nineteenth century on.261
Hence, land taken for-a courthouse, a highway, or a railroad usually required
compensation. 6 2 Similarly, land that was overflowed and destroyed by the
government's action would also require compensation."n But government
actions that devalued or injured property without fully destroying it were not
so obviously within the scope of eminent domain.2 64 Not surprisingly, the
sanitary plumbing. But it is always a question of degree, and a restriction of the most general
nature, with the public health, safety or morals most clearly its object, if in effect it deprives the
owners of lawfully acquired property which is not in itself a nuisance of the opportunity to
make any beneficial use thereof, may be held to be so severe as to amount to a taking, and to be
forbidden by the constitution unless the property which it affects is paid for.").
257 Nuisance cases did not require compensation and many cases of indirect harms did not
require compensation. See id. at 272-273, n.38-39.
258 See,. e.g., Bent v. Emery, 173 Mass. 495, 496, 498 (1899); Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501, 513
(1855); People v. Van De Carr, 178 N.Y. 425, 428 (1904); Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 38385, 405-06 (1856).
259 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 118-20 (discussing compensation for takings as a natural
right rather than a constitutional guarantee).

260 Id See generally Robert P. Bums, Blackstone's Theory of the "Absolute Rights of
Property, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 67 (1985) (discussing Blackstone's theory of property as an
absolute right vested in the individual by natural law); Bret Boyce, Property as a NaturalRight
and as a ConventionalRight in ConstitutionalLaw, 29 LoY. LA_ INT'L & CoMp. L. REV. (2007)
(discussing the influence of Grotius and Pufendorf on the recognition of property as a
fundamental right).
261 Id. at 282-84.
262 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005) (referring to the condemnation
of land for the use of a railroad as a familiar example of the power of eminent domain);
NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 53-54 (discussing the use of eminent domain to create government
buildings). Land taken for roads often did not require compensation because the benefits of the
road outweighed the burden, or because the road was seen to have a reciprocity of advantage.
See MORTON HORWrrZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERIcAN LAW, 1780-1860, 63-64 (1977);

Treanor, Originsand OigirnalSignificance,supranote 23, at 695.
263 See NICHOLS, supranote 8, at 286 (emphasizing that compensation is owed when valuable
property is destroyed because of public necessity).
264 Id at 293-94.
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difficult cases usually involved not land, but subsidiary rights associated
with land ownership, like riparian or access rights.2"
In a foundational case in 1816, Gardner v. Trustees of Newburgh,66
Chancellor Kent found that compensation was due when the Village of
Newburgh diverted water from a spring to provide water for the Village, but
thereby reduced the flow of water to downstream users.267 The Gardnercase
later became a precedent for other cases involving consequential damages,
or when public
as when waste water was discharged onto private land
infrastructure resulted in upstream flooding.2u
These non-appropriative takings cases tended to involve damage or
destruction to property rights that were already recognized under the
common law, like usufruct rights, riparian rights, leaseholds, and the like.
For instance, Chief Justice Shaw, in Patterson v. City of Boston,27
recognized that compensation was due when construction widening a street
resulted in the removal of the front part of a store and prevented the tenant
from using the store for twenty-five months.27' Justice Shaw ordered
compensation for the value of the lease, the expense of moving the tenant's
goods, and the loss of business associated with the store being closed. In
essence, the court ordered compensation for what was taken-a leaseholdplus the associated damages to what property was left. In a further case
involving consequential damages from railroad construction that destroyed
the complainant's well, Justice Shaw stated that: "It is made in the spirit of
the declaration of rights, giving compensation to persons sustainingdamage
for the public benefit." 273 The nineteenth-century courts were developing a
jurisprudence that distinguished between land that was appropriated and for
which compensation was undoubtedly due, and consequential harms that
required compensation or damages if the harm was 1) a directconsequence
of government actions that infringed certain 2) legally cogmizable property
rights.274 There were many cases in which government actions that adversely
affected access rights to land also required compensation, as when streets
were closed, widened, or construction necessitated temporary re-routings of
the public and consequential damages accrued thereby.2 71 On the contrary,
compensation was not due for indirect consequences that harmed only the
economic value or other non-legally cognizable property rights.276
265 See id at 404-60 (discussing takings in the context of riparian rights).
266 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816).
267 Id at 164.
268 Hooker v. New Haven & Northampton Col, 14 Coan 146, 151-52, 166-67 (1841).
269 Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 N.J.L. 129,143-44 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1839).
270 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 159 (1838).
271 Id at 165.
272 Id.at 162, 165-66.
273 Parker v. Boston &Maine R.R., 57 Mass. (3 Cush.) 107, 113 (1849) (emphasis added).
274 See, e.g., Hooker v. New Haven & Northampton Co., 14 Conn- 146, 168-69 (1841)

(explaining damages must be a caused by a direct government action).
275 See NicHOLs, supra note 8, at 172-77 (discussing the use of eminent domain to widen
highways).
276 See, e.g., Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418, 437-438 (1823) (explaining
compensation is not due for indirect consequences).
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At the same time as state courts were recognizing that eminent domain
applied to non-appropriations of property, they also rejected many claims
that sounded in nuisance. For instance, in 1845, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts reasoned that a statute prohibiting the removal of sand and
gravel from beaches was not a taking of property requiring compensation
because a landowner who removed sand and gravel from his own land
would be injuring the public's interest in the beaches.277 In 1877, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina upheld a state statute regulating drainage of
wetlands, asserting that the state's police power extended to making
property of A subservient to the property of B if doing so served a public
purpose. 78 In 1882, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a law
prohibiting pollution of waterways was not a taking.2 71 It stated:
[the] design of the act is not to take property for public use, nor does it do so
within the meaning of the constitution. It is intended to restrain and regulate the
use of private property so as to protect the common right of all the citizens of
the state. Such acts are plainly within the police power of the legislature, which
power is the mere application to the whole community of the maxim, 'sic utere
tuo, ut alienum non hwdas.' Nor does such a restraint, although it may interfere
with the profitable use of property by its owner, make it an appropriation to a
public use so as to entitle him to compensation.m
In 1896, the Supreme Court of Michigan upheld a statute prohibiting the
cutting of vegetation in riparian waters, even by the owner of the riparian
rights, as not a taking. ' And in 1912, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts held that a statute prohibiting the discharge of sawdust into a
stream with fish of sufficient value was not a taking without just
compensation. 82 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that laws
prohibiting water pollution are not a taking.'
Eminent domain applies only to a taking and not a regulation of use of private
property. There is sometimes a nice line of distinction between the two, but in
this instance the distinction is plain. There is no taking of private property
involved. The right to pollute public waters and endanger public health cannot
be acquired as a private property right. Neither the town nor an individual can
acquire a prescriptive right to endanger public health by discharging sewage
into public waters.28
These cases can be distinguished from those awarding compensation by
noting that the consequential damages cases usually involved public works,
and the question for the court was simply a matter of how far out damages
277 Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 55, 59 (1846).
278 Pool v. Trexler, 76 N.C. 297, 298 (1877).
279 State v. Wheeler, 44 N.J.L. 88, 91 (1882).
280 Id.

281 People v. Silberwood, 67 N.W. 1087, 1087, 1089 (Mich.1896).
282 Lyman v. Comm'rs on Fish and Game, 97 N.E. 66 (Mass. 1912).
283 Bd. of Purification of Waters v. Town of East Providence, 133 A. 812, 815 (1926).
284 Id
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would be owed. Obviously the land or water appropriated directly would
require compensation, adjacent landowners directly affected would require
compensation, and possibly downstream landowners, or others suffering
unique adverse effects of some sort, would be entitled to compensation.
Where the regulation prohibited certain uses, such as placing obstructions in
public ways, discharging effluent, or removing sand and gravel from the
beaches, the regulations did not originate in a public work for which
eminent domain was used, but rather sought to limit private land uses that
imposed harms on the public property or public welfare. Those cases never
required compensation.
Even physical destruction of property did not require compensation in
cases of grave public necessity. The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that
destruction of a diseased tree was not a taking requiring compensation.86
The destruction of a tree affected by a disease of that character, without
compensation to the owner, and against his will, is as fully within the police
power of a state as the destruction of a house threatened by a spreading
conflagration, or the clothes of a person who has fallen a victim to smallpox.
Such property is not taken for public use. It is destroyed because, in the
judgment of those to whom the law has confided the power of decision, it is of
no use, and is a source of public danger.2
The Supreme Court followed the same reasoning three decades later in
Miler v. Schoene in 1928.'
These cases show that courts were routinely dealing with land-use and
enviromnental regulations that devalued or even destroyed private property,
and some were not deemed to be an exercise of eminent domain requiring
compensation, while some were. Eminent domain was required when land,
title, or a cognizable property right was physically appropriated for a public
use, as when land was taken for a road, a railroad, or a public wharf. If
legally recognizable property rights were taken or impaired, compensation
would also be due. But mere regulations limiting some land uses and that did
not involve physical invasion, especially when they prevented public harms,
were not considered compensable under eminent domain.
I admit that these cases are sometimes difficult to reconcile, but on
closer examination several points of distinction appear. One line of
distinction is between affirmative and negative acts. In the cases requiring
compensation the government was usually engaging in an affirmative act,
like piping springs, widening streets, and authorizing the building of

285 State v. Main, 37 A. 80, 84 (Conn. 1897); see also Urbach v. City of Omaha, 163 N.W. 307,
308 (Neb. 1917) (finding that limitations on garbage collection is not a taking of the property of
the restauranteur who wants to sell his table scraps).
286 State v. Main, 37 A. at 84.
287 Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 278-80 (1928) (finding no compensation due for
destroying cedar trees infected with a disease that harmed nearby apple trees).
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railroads. m In the cases denying compensation, the government merely
prohibited landowners from engaging in a use that inflicted harm on
neighbors or the public."" A second distinction is between vested property
rights that were either legally cognizable property rights or consisted of uses
that were currently being undertaken, and use rights that were speculative
or ancillary to ownership of land, especially when other valuable use rights
remained. ° Regulations that resulted in the destruction of commonlyrecognized property rights were considered compensable under the
common law and state and federal Just Compensation Clauses.2l But mere
use rights or development plans were much more complicated. Activities
such as cutting weeds, discharging sawdust into the river, keeping diseased
trees or livestock, and even removing sand from one's own land were
curtailed without compensation. 2
Even the Supreme Court's early consideration of a consequential
damages case under eminent domain law in 1870, Yates v. City of
Milwaukee,20 dealt with the standard access and riparian rights of a
landowner who lost his wharf through a regulation prohibiting locating the
wharf in the navigable part of the river.m In the nineteenth century, riparian
and access rights to waterways were important and highly valuable property
rights, recognized at common law; they were marketable as independent
property rights, and as such were deemed compensable when public
infrastructure imposed significant limitations on the private rights.m
Restrictions prohibiting building structures above a certain height;
manufacturing alcoholic beverages; engaging in businesses that polluted
through dust, noise, and effluent; cutting plants; and removing sand and
gravel were all uses that were ancillary to ownership of land and, because
other uses were still permitted, they were generally not compensable even
when the harms from the regulation were significant.2 The clearest way to
reconcile these conflicting state-law eminent domain cases is to realize that
compensation was ordered for the acquisition or destruction of recognizable
property rights, for invasion onto one's land, and for the proximate harms
caused by public works, even when those harms were to a business or to a
288 See e.g., Patterson v. City of Boston, 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 425, 426-30 (1839) (discussing
how Boston's decision to tear down a warehouse to widen a street entitled the warehouse's
owner to compensation).
289 SeeMiller,276 U.S. at 279.
290 See id. at 277 (providing an example of a right ancillary to land ownership).
291 See Patterson, 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) at 430, 433 (ordering compensation for a taken
leasehold plus associated damages based on a state compensation statute).
292 See, e.g., Mler, 276 U.S. at 279 (allowing diseased trees to be cut without
compensation).
293 77 (10 Wall.) U.S. 497, 502 (1870).
294 Id at 498. Kris Kobach makes a big deal of this case as the first regulatory takings case,
even though it was not decided on constitutional principles and fit squarely within state-law
eminent domain cases involving riparian and access rights. See Kobach, supra note 2, at 126776.
295 NICHOLS, supranote 8, at 404-27.
296 Id at 51 (discussing the basic benefit-burden analysis for takings compensation and how
some harms that restrict some uses but leave others are not compensable).
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use commonly-associated with specific property rights. Compensation was
not ordered when only certain damaging uses were curtailed leaving other
permissible uses, when there was a reciprocity of advantage, when uses
were only speculative, and when there was no government action besides
curtailing the harmful uses. And until the 1870s, the courts had made a clear
distinction between uses that caused harm or were a nuisance, which could
uses that flowed naturally out of specific
be readily constrained, and
29 7
marketable property rights.
Thus, assuning we can identify with somewhat broad brush-strokes
certain distinct property rights, like riparian rights, access rights, usufruct
rights, and the like, and find them to be compensable when government
activity causes consequential harm as a result of public works, or regulatory
harm as a result of legislative declarations that destroy those rights, we are
well on the way toward resurrecting a coherent eminent domain
jurisprudence. Polluting, land uses that impose external harms on neighbors
or the public, and uses that impose health and safety risks clearly fit within
the law of nuisance and can be constrained without compensation. That
leaves a gray area wherein land use activities that are not quite so obviously
nuisances and involving property rights that are not quite so obviously of
long-standing independence may or may not require compensation. And the
question is, how does eminent domain help us with these hard cases?
I would suggest that a reinvigoration of the harm/benefit distinction in
nuisance, an emphasis on a cognizable property right, the consideration of
the important public purpose and thus a repudiation of Lingle, and allowing
the benefits of public uses to offset the burdens, as was typical of eminent
domain, would help us with the hard cases and get us well on the way to
replacing the incoherent regulatory takings doctrine with a revived and
coherent law of eminent domain. We also need to rethink how we treat
property rights by rejecting the natural rights ideology and revive, instead,
the post-Lochner positivism that permits regulation so long as there is an
important public purpose. I will discuss each of these.
B. Reject NaturalRights Ideology
The tension between theories of fundamental natural rights and
positivist property rights is not new or uncontested. Justices of the colonial
period, in the early republic, the antebellum years, Reconstruction, the
Lochner era, the New Deal, and into the modern period have all dealt with
the question of just how far government can modify or destroy property
rights without running afoul of the Constitution's property protections.298
Whether property rights are creatures of state law, subject to being defined
and redefined at will, or whether there is some core set of principles
297 Following well-established distinctions between benefit-conferring and harm-avoidance,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court readily accepted that compensation was not due for Yates' wharf
when the state had identified it as a nuisance. See Yates v. Judd, 18 Wis. 118, 127-28 (1864).
298 See generally Hulsebosch, supra note 11 (tracing takings jurisprudence from early
colonial America up to the nineteenth century).

2019]

REQUIEM FOR REGULATORY TAKINGS

355

protecting property that cannot be infringed is a question that has plagued
judges, philosophers, and political writers for centuries. And even the
brilliant minds on the Supreme Court will not settle the dispute, although
they may establish precedents that reflect one theory or the other. But as we
saw with the fundamental rights of the Lochner era, the prevailing theory of
property rights is only as persuasive as the economic and environmental
pressures on the Court. As the pendulum swings toward greater protection
of property rights, the law of eminent domain lies in the crosshairs, and
compensation is ordered for government regulations and consequential
harms that would be deemed to be merely a cost of living in civil society in a
different era. And just as state judges have grappled with the changing
terrain of property rights, so too has the Supreme Court.
Following the Civil War, the crisis of slavery severely tested natural
rights theories of property." In one articulation of the balance between
private property and public rights, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky noted
that government is that which defines and protects property as well as that
which destroys property for public purposes.&' In a case alleging that the
government should compensate for the destruction of property rights in
slaves, the court explained that property rights must be balanced with the
public welfare:
But... the warrantor of title [the private slave owner who sold a slave to a
buyer just before emancipation and was sued by the buyer when the property
rights were nullified] never was the guarantor of the future action of the
Government. Its subsequent action therefore, whether legal or revolutionary
never can be a breach of the warranty. If the action is legal then it is but the
exercise of a right attached to all property held under its sovereignty, that the
public necessity is superior to the individual right, and that the sovereign may
resume the property when such public necessity arises, and that the
Government must judge of this. Without those political organizations known as
government, to which is delegated the sovereign power of the people, by
written constitutions, declaring, delegating and restricting the sovereign
powers conferred and of the people themselves and declaring the rights of the
citizen, property would be of little consequence and the right thereto ideal; as
each must, therefore look to those political organizations known as states, in
the larger or more restricted sense for the vindication and protection of his
rights of property, as well as life and liberty, he must also submit to such
political changes and the modification of those rights which the Government
may legitimately make, or which it has the physical power and inclination to
force on all.
The warranty of title by one individual to another can never be construed as
warranting against the superior right of the Government to resume the property
on compensation when the public necessity shall require, because the rights of
299 Id

300 See Hood v. Yowel, 3 Ky. Op. 357, 358 (Ky. App. 1869) (dealing with a slave owner who
brought a takings claim to recover for emancipation).
301 See id.at 359 (discussing the government's power to destroy a home in order to prevent
the spread of fire).
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the purchaser as a citizen is equally involved in that public necessity with the
warrantor and his compensation for the deprivation of a private right for the
public good is to come from the Government. The right to blow up and destroy
a house in a town or city to prevent the spread of a conflagration is a legal
public right, residing in all towns and cities as a public necessity, and this even
without compensation, for it is not the exercise of eminent domain, yet this
would be no breach of warranty of title by a vendor, but is a condition annexed

to all property so situated. So of revolutionary physical power residing in the
masses, when by physical revolutionary power they determine to modify or
change their political institutions, however, they may be violative of the private
rights of the citizen, he must submit because there is no remedy, but is one of
the conditions annexed to the absolute necessity, each is under of being a party

of some political family.m
In contrast to the Kentucky Court of Appeals decision, the Supreme
Court's decision in Yates v.Milwaukee applied an expansive and robust
theory of property rights involving consequential damages in the height of
Reconstruction. In Yates, the City of Milwaukee had established a wharf line
in the Milwaukee River (a line between the public navigable portion of a
navigable river and the non-navigable shallow edges) and prohibited Yates
from retaining his wharf past that line.3 Even though the line actually
extended landward into the non-navigable portion of the river and thus
through Yates' pre-existing wharf, the City claimed his wharf was a nuisance
because it was within the supposedly navigable portion of the river.3 The
City ordered it destroyed as an obstruction to navigation even though the
actual wharf did not extend into the actual navigable part of the river.3
Relying on the state law of eminent domain, the Supreme Court held that
drawing the wharf line where it did took Yates' riparian rights and required
Despite an ordinance designating Yates' wharf as a
compensation.3
nuisance, the Court insisted that the riparian and access rights were vested
and valuable property rights, that unless their use created a nuisance they
could not be infringed without compensation, and simply calling something
a nuisance did not make it so. Although Yates was decided without
reference to any constitutional just compensation doctrine and under state
law of eminent domain, Justice Miller's skepticism of the government's
justification of the wharf as a nuisance can't help but resonate in Justice
Roberts' fear that government will gerrymander to avoid takings claims. 3"8
That robust sense of property rights prevailed again in 1871 when the
Court, using a state constitution's Just Compensation Clause, ordered
compensation for land overflowed by water from a downstream dam in

at 359-60.
303 Yates, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497, 498 (1870).
304 Id The City was permitted by statute to dredge the river to the full wharf line to make
the river more navigable, but it did not do so. Id.
3o2 Id

305 Id at 498-99.

306 Id at 505, 507.
307 Id at 504-05.
308 See id at 503-05; discussion of Roberts's dissent in Mur, supraPart BI.A.
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Pumpefly v. Green Bay Co.3 Pumpellywas a case, however, that fell within
310
the long line of water-invasion cases from the earlier half of the century.
But the Court was unwilling to adopt a strong theory of fundamental
property rights only a few years later in Railroad Co. v. Richmond' in 1877
and Transportation Co. v. Chicagd3 a year after that. Ironically, as the
Transportation Co. v. Chicago Court rejected a robust theory of property
rights, it used a deferential interpretation of the police power to deny
compensation for indirect and consequential damages to property.3
Essentially, the Court held that state eminent domain law might provide
remedies for the consequential damages of public works, but doing so was
not required by the Constitution.1 4 In Transportation Co., Justice Strong
rejected a takings claim by a passenger steamer company for damages to its
business when it could not land ships at the public wharf or an adjacent
street because of public works construction that interfered with its riparian
rights.315 Although this case looked an awful lot like the cases involving
consequential damages to property rights resulting from public works
projects that had been decided by earlier state courts, Justice Strong
rejected a constitutional theory of recovery, explaining:
The remedy, therefore, for a consequential injury resulting from the State's
action through its agents, if there be any, must be that, and that only, which the
legislature shall give.... [A]cts done in the proper exercise of governmental
powers, and not directly encroaching upon private property, though their
consequences may impair its use, are universally held not to be a taking within
the meaning of the constitutional provision. They do not entitle the owner of
such property to compensation from the State or its agents, or give him any
right of action.1 6
This rejection of a robust theory of eminent domain in the context of
regulations and public works that inflict consequential or collateral damage
to property rights is difficult to explain in light of Yates, but was consistent
with a judicial retrenchment in the application of national rights and
constitutional protections against state action. Notably, Yates was decided
as a matter of common-law eminent domain while Railroad Co. and
Transportation Co. were constitutional cases.3 17' Thus, the Slaughter-House
Cases, Bradwefi v. State, Munn v. Illinois, Mugler v Kansas, and the Civil
Rights Cases all reveal a Court taking a relatively hands-off approach to
claims that the states were infringing federally-protected constitutional

309
310
311
312

80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166,167, 176-78, 181 (1871).
NICHOLS, supranote 8, at 311-315.
R.R. Co. v. Richmond, 96 U.S. 521, 528-29 (1877).
Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 641-42 (1878).

313 Id.

314 Id
315 Id. at 639-40.
316 Id at 641-42.
317 Yates, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497, 504 (1870); R.E Co., 96 U.S. 521, 529 (1877); Transp. Co., 99
U.S. at 642.
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rights.18 Of course, that philosophy would change in the last decade of the
nineteenth and early decades of the twentieth century as the Court used the
Constitution's protections of individual property rights as a sword to strike
down hundreds of state laws during the Lochner period.319 But in the
aftermath of Reconstruction and before incorporation of the Just
Compensation Clause to the states in 1897, the Supreme Court used
rescission and not compensation as the preferred remedy for government
run amok."
It would certainly not be inaccurate to describe the Supreme Court's
property jurisprudence as swinging back and forth on how much deference
should be paid to state determinations of the public welfare and the scope of
the police power.32' The Court was relatively unconcerned with the scope of
the police power in the first half of the nineteenth century (a result of
32
But then there was a more aggressive application of
Barron v. Baltimore).
federal common law and constitutional protections in the 1860s and 1870s,
followed by a retrenchment as the heyday of public works were underway in
the 1880s and 1890s.32 Then there was another period of aggressive review
during the Lochner era, followed again by a repudiation of heightened
scrutiny and a rejection of economic substantive due process in 1937.
Finally, there is a revitalization of heightened scrutiny in the 1980s through
the present in the jurisprudence of regulatory takings.3 25Is the third time the
charm?
This ever-moving pendulum swing in the Court's approach to property
rights, seeing them as fundamental natural rights for a while, and then as
positivist creations of law, illustrates the difficulty of striking the right
balance between the public welfare and private property rights. It seems that
as soon as the Court swings one way, governments gerrymander to destroy
private property. When the Court swings back to protect certain core
property rights, environmental and public necessity impels a rejection of
landowner gamesmanship. And not surprisingly, striking the right balance is
not a problem unique to our times, for it was- well-remarked upon by
scholars of an earlier period.
Thomas Cooley, in his 1868 treatise on constitutional limitations,
rejected strong property rights protections under the Constitution for
consequential damages or the devaluation of property, claiming instead that:

318 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 37-38 (1872); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall) 130, 138-39 (1872); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 114 (1876); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623,623-24 (1887); CivlRights Cases,109 U.S. 3,3-4 (1889).
319 See supranotes 38-40 and accompanying text.
320 See supranotes 41-43 and accompanying text.
321 See Barros, supranote 49, at 478-83.
322 See supranotes 136-144 and accompanying text.
323 Compare, e.g, Pumpelly 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871), with Chic., Burlington & Quincy

Ry. Co. v. People, 200 U.S. 561 (1905).
324 See supranotes 37-41, 68 and accompanying text.
325 James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, Weigffing the Need to EstablishReglatory Tadngs
Doctrine to Justify Takings Standards of Review and Principles,34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REV., 315, 323-28 (2010).

2019]

REQUIEM FOR REGULATORY TAKINGS

359

Any proper exercise of the powers of government, which does not directly
encroach upon the property of an individual, or disturb him in its possession or
enjoyment, will not entitle him to compensation, or give him a right of action.
If, for instance, the State, under its power to provide and regulate the public
highways, should authorize the construction of a bridge across a navigable
river, it is quite possible that all proprietary interests in land upon the river
might be injuriously affected; but such injury could no more give a valid claim
against the State for damages, than could any change in the general laws of the
State, which, while keeping in view the general good, might injuriously affect
particular interests. 8

Cooley's treatise was relied upon by Justice Strong in Transportation Co.,
where the Court denied a constitutional remedy for consequential damage
caused by public works construction. 7 For Cooley, compensation should be
provided only for direct encroachment upon private property, i.e.,
appropriation, invasion, or destruction, as the Court held in 1871 in
Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co 3 1 Pumpelly was decided
under the Wisconsin constitution's Just Compensation Clause but Justice
Stone noted that where
real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand,
or other material, or by having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to
effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking, within the meaning of
the Constitution, and that this proposition is not in conflict with the weight of
judicial authority in this country, and certainly not with sound principle.
Beyond this we do not go, and this case calls us to go no further.32

326

THoMAs COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE

LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION

541-42 (1868).

327 Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878).
328 80 U.S. 166, 181 (1871). COOLEY, supra note 326, at 541-45.
329 Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 181. It would also seem that Kobach's description of the Supreme

Court's heightened protection of property through application of eminent domain in cases of
consequential damages may be a bit of an over-statement. See Kobach, supranote 2, at 1268-73.
In Yates, the case was decided under state common law, and in Pumpelly, the case was decided
under the state's constitution, but the former involved removing a wharf that had been used and
relied upon for years (i.e., was a vested property right), and the latter involved physical invasion
of water in the permanent flooding of the petitioner's land. Compare Yates, 77 U.S. 497, 503-07
(1870), with Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 176-77. Neither case involved the devaluative regulatory
taking that some state courts had recognized under their common law of eminent domain.
Hence, when the Court rejected consequential damages as a result of public works in 1877 and
1878 in RailroadCo. and Transportation Co., and cited Cooley that any remedies lay at state
law, I don't believe the latter cases evidenced a retreat in property protections so much as a
clarification that federal constitutional protections provided a floor, and not a ceiling for
property rights. Both Yates and Pumpelly involved physical invasion and harm to land, harms
that easily fit within common-law eminent domain principles, while mere consequential damage
was a much more contested subject. Justice Miller, in Pumpelly, also acknowledged that
collateral damages were not recoverable in many states. He explained, "We are not unaware of
the numerous cases in the State courts in which the doctrine has been successfully invoked that
for a consequential injury to the property of the individual arising from the prosecution of
improvements of roads, streets, rivers, and other highways, for the public good, there is no
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In the height of the Lochner era, Nichols complained that property
rights were being too assiduously protected at the expense of public rights,
and he yearned for a return to Cooley's view of eminent domain liability only
m
for direct harms to vested property rights. Nichols explained, in 1917, that
the loss of an independent judiciary, particularly with the adoption of rules
allowing for judicial recalls and judicial elections, had elevated private
3
property rights in derogation of public rights. ' He argued:
[niot one man in a thousand realizes that a decision in favor of the land owner
is a decision against the public, and that a series of such decisions will result in
the complete subordination of the essential public right of eminent domain to
the private rights of ownership in land. As a result, the decision in favor of the
land owner is always the popular one, and to a judge seeking re-election even at
the expense of the maintenance of sound principles of law the only safe course
32
is to decide against the public rights in every eminent domain case that arises.
For Nichols, the public interest had to be considered in eminent domain
cases or else private property rights would hijack the police power. Nichols
argued that before the loss of the independent judiciary, a landowner who
was upset about state actions had to go to the legislature for a remedy.3 He
further explained:
After the majority of the states had lost their independent judiciary, cases of
individual hardship received a different treatment. When the legislature of a
state intentionally or inadvertently had enacted a law which authorized the
interference with private property rights in a novel, harsh or unjust manner,
although not in violation of any express provision of the constitution, the
highest court of the state, instead of enforcing the law and letting the public, if
it so desired, elect a legislature that would remedy the injustice, would
sometimes evolve a subtle theory by which it could be demonstrated to the
satisfaction of those who were anxious to be convinced that the victims of the
law were being deprived of their constitutional rights. The theory thus evolved
would be seized upon with eagerness by the courts of other states, and by
equally heedless annotators, regardless of the fact that the effect of the
acceptance of the theory would be the curtailment of public rights and
sometimes even the surrender of public property without the consent of the
people or their representatives, and in a very short time the new theory would
become known as the "enlightened doctrine," and be adopted as a binding
principle of constitutional law in many if not all of the states which had
established an elective judiciary. As a result of the acceptance of these novel
theories, limiting the exercise of the power of eminent domain in so many
particulars, in many states the construction of public improvements has been

redress; and we do not deny that the principle is a sound one, in its proper application, to many
injuries to property so originating." Id at 180-81.
330 NICHOLS, supranote 8, at 3-4.

331 Id at 45.
332 Id at 45-46.
333 Id at 46.
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rendered extremely precarious, and the development of the resources of the
community retarded to a marked degree."'
Nichols' version of the rise of private property rights, tied to the rise of
the elected judiciary, may be oversimplified. But he is correct that property
rights protections were not as stringent, nor did they have the constitutional
basis, that they acquired during the Lochnerera when he was writing, during
Reconstruction when Justice Miller penned Yates, or in the modem
regulatory takings era. Narrowing the law of eminent domain has been just
one effect of the elevation of private property over public rights; regulatory
takings seems to be another. And with that shift government has lost much
of its power to protect the public at large from degradation of the
environment, the effects of climate change, the destruction of wildlife and its
habitat, and the guarantee of a safe and clean urban landscape.
With eminent domain, as with regulatory takings, it is not always easy
to draw a bright line between regulations that go too far and those that
simply adjust the benefits and burdens of modem life-i.e., between
regulatory takings and the police power. Nichols provides a distinction
between mere police power regulations and assertions of eminent domain
by explaining: "the police power may be somewhat loosely described as the
power of the sovereign to prevent persons under its jurisdiction from
conducting themselves or using their property to the detriment of the
general welfare."' He goes on to explain:
In the exercise of eminent domain property or an easement therein is taken
from the owner and applied to public use because the use or enjoyment of such
property or easement therein is beneficial to the public; in the exercise of the
police power the owner is denied the unrestricted use, or enjoyment of his
property, or his property is taken from him, because his use or enjoyment of
such property is injurious to the public welfare."3
Justice Holmes, writing at the same time as Nichols, viewed the balance
between eminent domain and the police power somewhat differently. An
important decision is Parker v. CommonwealIth in which a Massachusetts
statute, passed in 1899, limited the height of buildings on lands near the state
house.3 The statute expressly provided that damages would be available for
any petitioner who was deprived of rights existing under the Constitution.'
Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes explained that the law did more
than take an easement to benefit the state house; rather, the statute
benefitted the people of the state by saving the dignity and beauty of the city,
and its narrow application to a few small tracts of land did not disqualify it

33
335
336
337
338

Id at 46-47.
Id at 53.
Id at 54.
59 N.E. 634 (Mass. 1901).
Id at 634.

339 Id at 635.
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from serving a public goal.? ° The question for the court, however, was
whether the right to compensation was triggered only to the extent the
statute exceeded the scope of the police power, or whether the right to
compensation extended to everyone affected by the statute, regardless of
the extent or lack of actual damage. 34' Holmes explained:
[t]he exercise of the police power always deprives a party of what would be his
rights under the constitution but for [an adjudication that the public needs
require the restriction of property rights without compensation]. The
justification of a building law is not that it does not qualify or affect a right
under the constitution; if that were the justification the petitioners would be
entitled to nothing because no right of theirs would have been infringed. The
justification is that although the law affects or even takes away such rights it
may do so within reasonable and somewhat narrow limits upon considerations
which the constitution cannot be supposed to have been intended to exclude.3
Justice Holmes, in this case, viewed the duty to compensate as tied to
the existence or absence of a legislative declaration of public need, and not
on some quantum of the magnitude of the restriction.' As he explained,
"[tjhe right to build the seventy-first foot from the ground is just as much a
right under the constitution as the right to build the sixty-ninth or the first. It
may be of less importance, but it is the same in kind."3"
For Holmes, all property rights are constitutionally protected, but some
infringements are too minor or too necessary for the public good to require
an exercise of eminent domain and compensation. They are the price one
pays to live in a civilized society. If the infringement is de mininis or the
public interest justifies the infringement, then the harm is non-compensable
and the government's act is permissible under the police power and the
regulatory harms fall outside the bounds of constitutional protection. For
Nichols, however, only when a cognizable property right is directly taken for
public use must eminent domain be exercised and compensation paid. If
property is merely infringed or restricted, then the regulation is squarely
within the police power and does not implicate eminent domain.
The subtle distinctions between Nichols's version of property rights and
Holmes's version reflects the timeless and ever-shifting nature of balancing
private property with the public welfare. Both Nichols and Holmes were
writing in the height of the property-protectionist Lochner era But Nichols
340 Id
341 Id
342 Id

at 635-36. In this case, the statute allowed for compensation when constitutional
rights were deprived, but the legislature did not state that there was a public need for the
legislation. Id. at 635. The court therefore held that compensation was due for the entire scope
of the act, not just for the effects of the act that went beyond permissible police power
limitations. Id Expressing the discomfort with an interpretation that allowed government to
regulate up to some hypothetical line without a duty to compensate under the police power, but
then the duty to compensate kicks in for all regulations beyond that line, Holmes instead
focused on the public need and not on the quantity of the restriction. Id
343 Id.
344 Id.
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viewed the mis-steps of the era's embrace of robust private property rights
as a result of politics and institutional pressures, while Holmes viewed
property as static and only the government's justifications as the relevant
variable in the constitutional analysis. For Nichols, property was a positivist
creature of law that served public needs, while for Holmes property was an
absolute. For Holmes, however, despite the belief that property rights were
absolute, constitutional protections rose or fell with the importance of the
government's interest and the extent of the effect of regulations on private
property. For Nichols, private property served public ends only, and when
private property rights are elevated at the public expense it was because of a
dysfunctional political process. For Holmes, property rights are always
affected by regulations, but balancing the public need and the private harms
in light of important governmental goals was at the heart of his
interpretation of the Constitution's property protections.
Throughout our history, there has been tremendous pressure on state
courts to view property rights as fundamental, natural rights, as entitlements
that could not be negatively affected without compensation even for
consequential damage or devaluation caused by public works or by
regulations. Yet despite the pressure, commentators and judges generally
rejected the extreme view that consequential damages required
compensation. And of course, if any consequential damages were going to be
compensated, courts would have to draw a line between those that were
direct enough to deserve compensation and those that were not. One of
those lines appears to be between vested property rights, i.e., use rights
currently being enjoyed, and those that were only speculative. Another line
was between direct and consequential damages. A third was between
affirmative government action pursuing active public works, and regulations
that simply prevented certain harmful uses. A fourth was between
government actions that resulted in invasion or destruction of property and
those that simply resulted in inconvenience, or devaluation. In all of these
cases, however, there was a strong recognition by judges and commentators
that property is held at the will of the government, and that eminent domain
is the right of the sovereign to determine when private property rights must
give way to public needs.
As Thomas Cooley explained:
[a]ll these rights rest upon a principle which in every sovereignty is essential to
its existence and perpetuity, and which, so far as when called into action it
excludes pre-existing private rights, is sometimes spoken of as based upon an
implied reservation by the government when its citizens acquire property from
it or under its protection... More accurately, it is the rightful authority which
must rest in every sovereignty to control and regulate those rights of a public
nature which pertain to its citizens in common, and to appropriate and control
individual property for the public benefit, as the public safety, convenience, or
necessity may demand.4

345 COOLEY, supranote 326, at 524.
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Thus, fundamental property rights, as pre-dating government or as
consisting of strong natural rights was soundly rejected by many legal
scholars of the nineteenth century as they acknowledged that sovereignty
entails the power to define property rights and the power to reclaim them
for public needs. This positivist understanding of property rights, although
perhaps not uniformly accepted by political theorists, was the prevailing
view of property by judges, lawyers, and commentators facing the great
developments of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as each
experiment with strong property rights failed2u 6
C. Reinvigorate the Harm/BenefitDistinctionin Nuisance andRethinmng
Lingle
Another important aspect of rationalizing regulatory takings
jurisprudence through revitalizing eminent domain and positivist property
rights will be to reinvigorate the harm/benefit distinction from nuisance law
that Justice Scalia undermined in Lucas. And although I am not one to
7
disagree with torts scholars that nuisance law is a "'wilderness' of law, "34
a
"mystery,"3 an "impenetrable jungle,"39 and a "legal garbage can"3° full of
"vagueness, uncertainty and confusion, " 3 I do believe nuisance continues to
serve as a viable and valuable legal tool. When Justice Scalia elided the
benefit-conferring and harm-prevention aspects of nuisance, he essentially
removed consideration in constitutional cases of all normative
characteristics of particular property uses and the public purpose. He
asserted that David Lucas building a home was just as valuable and innocent
as his neighbors wanting better beach protection. But as a quick analysis of
nuisance laws will show, there are land uses that inevitably impose harm on
neighbors. Dumping sawdust into a river, excavating sand and gravel from
the beach, cutting vegetation, dispelling surface water, emitting noise and
effluent, and even expanding one's hardware store to attract more shoppers
are all uses of land that impose external harms on neighbors. Developments
that worsen the effects of natural disasters, like floods and hurricanes,
which cause untold damage to neighboring properties are nuisances, even if
they also have positive externalities as well.
The problem with Justice Scalia's elision of harm-prevention and
benefit-conferring is that there are certain uses of private property that
impose tremendous harms, even if they are also important and valuable
uses. The cement plant, the brick factory, the slaughterhouse, and the pig

346 See Hulsebosch, supra note 11, at 974 (explaining that property rights were understood
in relation to writs rather than an inherent right).
347 HORACE WOOD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAw OF NUISANCES IN THEIR VARIOUS FORMS:
INCLUDING REMEDIES THEREFORE AT LAW AND IN EQUITY; at iii (3d ed. 1893).
348 Warren Seavey, Nuisance: ContributoryNegligence and OtherMysteries, 65 HARv. L. REv.
984, 984 (1952) (quoting Delaney v. Philhern Realty Holding Co., 280 N.Y. 461,468 (1939)).
349 WILLIAM L PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 549 (1941).
350 William Prosser, Nuisance WthoutFauit 20 TEx. L. REV. 399,410 (1942).
351 Id at 550.
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farm are all valuable land uses, but they are also productive of great harm to
neighboring lands. We cannot say that some uses are always and only bad
and some are always and only good. In that sense, Justice Scalia was right.
But the solution is not to give up the point, but to embrace the social utility
balancing that is the heart of the police power. The social utility balancing of
nuisance is precisely the right tool to determine whether the burdens of
certain land uses outweigh the benefits and it represents the same ad hoc
balancing the Court adopted in Penn Central and seems unwilling to
renounce.
Reclaiming the viability of nuisance law does not require that we make
perfect sense of the vagueness, uncertainty, and confusion of nuisance. What
it does require is that eminent domain jurisprudence engage in a social
utility balancing of private rights and public harms. If all land uses are
deemed to be morally equivalent, as Justice Scalia claimed, then social utility
balancing is impossible. However, the Court's 2017 decision in Murraffirmed
the importance of balancing the benefits and burdens of public life. 2 It is
necessary, therefore, to eschew strict formulas and per se rules and engage,
instead, in thoughtful balancing of the harms that all land uses inflict. This
balancing must be done with the public interest in mind for, as Cooley noted,
sovereignty is the rightful authority to control private property for public
benefit.m To do so a court must consider the public benefit in weighing the
constitutionality of private harms.
The Court's decision in Murr was a significant retreat from the per se
rules of the conservative wing of the Court, undermining Lucas, and marking
a possible retreat from the rigid property rights of modem regulatory
takings. For if a court must consider multiple factors, like the treatment of
the land under state and local law, the physical characteristics of the land,
and the prospective value of the regulated land in order to determine a
landowner's reasonable expectations,"' the court will be engaging in ad hoc
balancing simply to determine the property being affected by a regulation or
government action. m More importantly, as Justice Kennedy explained, "[t]he
inquiry is objective and the reasonable expectations at issue derive from
background customs and the whole of our legal tradition."m By viewing
property rights within the context of our legal tradition, including the
common law of eminent domain and nuisance, as well as the regulatory
environment under which the property was acquired, a court can do
precisely the social utility balancing that Justice Holmes identified in Penn
Coaland which is necessary in non-appropriative eminent domain actions.

352 Murr, 137

S. Ct. 1933,1943 (2017).
353 COOLEY, supra note 326, at 524.
354 Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1938.
355 This is precisely what Justice Blackmun predicted would result from the per se rule of
Lucas, See Lucas 505 U.S. at 1066 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Either courts will alter the
definition of the 'denominator' in the takings 'fraction,' rendering the Court's categorical nile
meaningless, or investors will manipulate the relevant property interests, giving the Court's rule
sweeping effect.").
356 Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945.
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Moreover, the kind of balancing needed for a coherent law of eminent
domain requires consideration of the public interest. Without the public
interest on one side of the scale, private property rights become intransigent.
As a result, the Court needs to rethink exactly what it meant in Lingle.
Although I sympathize with the pickle the Court found itself in from too
much blurring of due process and regulatory takings as a result of the
language in the Agins test, simply excluding the public interest flies in the
face of the common law's rich legal tradition. If the eminent domain cases
show anything, it is that the public purpose of government action is a valid
factor in any compensation analysis. Certainly, a purported public interest
that in fact disserves the public good should be suspect, and regulations that
serve only to deprive one of private property without any corresponding
public benefit should make one pause. But in all of the eminent domain
cases discussed in Part IV.A infA the public interest was front and center.
Roads, railroads, canals, navigable waterways, bridges, courthouses, and
other public infrastructure clearly meet the constitutional requirement of a
tadng for public use. So too was preventing pollution, erosion of beaches,
and destruction of wildlife habitat. Without a viable public interest
requirement, it becomes very difficult to distinguish between taking private
property for private use, which is never permitted, and taking it for a public
use, which is permitted with compensation. And restricting property to
avoid the harms of a nuisance also require a consideration of the public
purpose of the restriction. Thus, distinguishing between unconstitutional
government acts, constitutional acts that require compensation, and
constitutional acts that are part of the benefits and burdens of modern life
and therefore do not require compensation must consider the public
purpose.
D. Require a Cogzizable PropertyRight and an Act ofAppropriation
The Court has struggled in considering what to do with regulations that
devalue property or limit its use without entailing a physical invasion,
appropriation of a cognizable property right, or a clear nuisance. But the
nineteenth-century eminent domain cases make clear that vested property
rights are a precursor to a regulatory eminent domain case. 7 In the grey
area between nuisance and vested property rights, mere regulations that do
not actually appropriate private property for public use should be deemed,
as Jed Rubenfeld argues, non-compensable.35 In order for a property
claimant to receive compensation, she should be required to give up
ownership of a legally-cognizable, marketable property right. And to
illustrate why that should be a requirement, consider the hundreds of cases
currently before the Court of Claims and the Federal Circuit regarding the
railbanking statute3 9
See supranote 261 and accompanying text.
358 Rubenfeld, supranote 26, at 1080.
359 See Danaya C. Wright, Rai/l-to-Trai/s: Conversion of Raiload Coidoras to Recreational
Trai&, in 11 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 78A.13 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2018).
357
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The popular rails-to-trails program has generated hundreds of lawsuits
and been found to require millions of dollars in compensation when a
railroad corridor is converted to a recreational trail.3w But compensation is
not due in all cases and, as I would argue, should not be due in hardly any. In
certain situations, a railroad holds only an easement or a defeasible fee in its
corridor, and private landowners own the underlying fee or a reversionary
interest. ' When a railroad then seeks to discontinue railroad operations and
transfer its corridor lands to a trail group, it can railbankits corridor by
seeking railbanking authorization from the Surface Transportation Board.32
If the corridor is railbanked, it may be used for interim trail use, it is
preserved for future rail reactivation, the railroad retains its common carrier
obligations, federal regulatory jurisdiction remains over the corridor, and the
adjacent landowners are precluded from regaining possession during the
period of railbanking.m The federal railbanking statute provides that statelaw private property rights will be held in limbo during the period of railroad
abeyance and interim recreational trail use.' Thus, through a regulation
governing the federal railroad regulatory authority,' railroads have a choice
of fully abandoning their corridors, in which case corridor land they do not
own in fee becomes unburdened or reverts to private landowners, or they
can railbank the corridors, in which case possession of the land remains

Id at § 78A.02 (discussing many such cases).
361 If the railroad holds only an easement, then someone else owns the underlying fee
interest. But because railroad easements are exclusive, the underlying fee owner does not have
access to or possession of that fee interest; the land will simply become unburdened upon
360

termination of the railroad easement. See id. § 78A.06[2]. If the railroad holds a defeasible fee of
some sort, as a fee simple on condition subsequent or a fee simple determinable, then the
railroad has, the present estate and someone else owns the future interest. See id Usually that
future interest is a reversionary interest (a power of termination or a possibility of reverter),
that is triggered when the present estate terminates, allowing the future interest holder to
acquire possession. See id. Unfortunately, many courts addressing the complicated issue of
railbanking and trail conversion do not appropriately distinguish between the two kinds of
interests and often refer to them collectively as "reversionary interests." See id Although for
simplicity's sake I also refer to the rights of landowners as reversionary rights, the legal effects
and meaning of the two different categories can be quite distinct. See id.
362 See Wright, supranote 359, § 78A.11[1].
363 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (2012) states:
in the case of interim use of any established railroad rights-of-way... if such interim use
is subject to restoration or reconstruction for railroad purposes, such interim use shall
not be treated, for purposes of any law or rule of law, as an abandonment of the use of
such rights-of-way for railroad purposes.
The reason for passing the statute was to preserve these valuable railroad corridors for future
rail service, utility placement, and interim trail use. Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n,
494 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1990). Congress provided the option to keep the corridors intact during a
period of interim discontinuation and trail use, keeping open the option of future reactivation
and thus postponing the abandonment of the corridors and the reversion of any private
property rights in the corridor land. See Wright, supra note 359, § 78A.11[1].
364 See Wright, supra note 359, § 78A.11[1]. The railbanking statute was held to be a
constitutionally permissible regulation under the Commerce Clause in Preseau4 but Justice
O'Connor stated in her concurring opinion that whether the statute works as a taking depends
on how the property rights are defined under state law. See 494 U.S. at 23-24.
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with the railroad or its grantee. Prior to the railbanking statute, railroads
only had one option upon discontinuation: full abandonment and loss of
possession of the corridor land.m
Some courts have described the railbanking process as a taking of the
landowners' reversionary rights; others refer to it as a postponing of a nonvested future interest. 6 In either event, the argument is that but for the
statute giving railroads the railbanking option, a railroad that sought to
abandon presumably would do so and the landowners would regain
unencumbered possession. With the ability to railbank, landowners are
precluded from exercising their reversionary property rights to regain
possession of land within the abandoned rail corridor. This statute provides
an excellent illustration of the incoherence of regulatory takings and how
eminent domain would help solve the conundrum.
With the typical railbanked corridor, federal regulatory jurisdiction
remains over the railroad corridor through the Surface Transportation
Board's issuance of a Certificate of Interim Trail use. 7 Because the STB did
not authorize final abandonment, the private landowners may not claim
possession of the corridor land and the corridor can .then be transferred
intact to a trail group, usually a state or county parks department or a
highway department.m When landowners successfully claim a regulatory
taking of their reversionary rights in the railroad corridor, the United States
pays compensation to the landowners but receives nothing in return."'
Landowners do not deed a property right to the federal government, nor is
anything recorded down at the courthouse. Because the federal government
receives nothing for its compensation, there is no property right it can
transfer to the local trail group.3 70 Because the effect of the statute is to preempt the vesting of a future interest, there is no vested property right that is
taken; the statute merely postpones the event that would trigger the
landowner's right to possession.
This is not the place for a lengthy discussion of the intricacies of
railbanking, which is provided in other articles.3' Rather, the railbanking

365 See Wright, supra note 359, § 78A-03 (describing the mass abandonment of railroad lines
before the rail-to-trail program).
366 Howard v. United States, 106 Fed. C1. 343, 368 (2012); Macy Elevator, Inc. v. United
States, 97 Fed. C1. 708, 730 (2011). But see Lowers v. United States, 663 N.W.2d 408, 413 (Iowa
2003) (holding that the state's marketable title act extinguished the property rights before they
could vest so there was no taking because the landowner had no property rights in the railroad
corridor).
367 See Wright, supra note 359, § 78A.11[2].
368 Id § 78A.11[1], [4].
369 Id § 78A.11[1].
370 See id. (describing the railroad's retention of their rights throughout the railbanking
process).
371 See generally Wright, supra note 359, § 78A.11; Danaya C. Wright, Eminent Domain,

Exactions, and Radbanidng: Can Recreational Trails Survve the Court's Flfth Amendment
Jurisprudence? 26 COLUM. J. ENvTL LAw 399 (2001); Danaya C. Wright, Reliance Interests and
Takings Liabilityfor Rail-TrailConversions Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States,
44 Envtl. L Rep. (Envtl. L Inst.) 10173 (2014); Danaya C. Wright, The Shift7g Sands of Propefty
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statute illustrates why regulatory takings can be so incoherent and how a
requirement that a vested property right be appropriated when
compensation is paid would help solve the problem. Thus, if a regulation is
so severe as to destroy or devalue a vested property right, then, as Justice
Holmes admonished, eminent domain should be exercised, compensation
paid, and a property right appropriated. A landowner who receives
compensation for the pre-emptive effects of the railbanking statute,
therefore, should have her reversionary interest condemned and a deed
should be provided. Then, if the railroad or trail group later fully abandons
the corridor, the landowner may not claim possession. If, however, the
regulatory action merely postpones the triggering event, an event that is
uncertain to occur anyway, and for which no one has a vested property right
in its occurrence, then no protected property right has been taken and no
compensation should be due.3 2 The reversionary interest remains in the
landowner and, when railbanking ends, and the corridor is permanently
abandoned, the landowner may reclaim unencumbered possession.
In a situation like railbanking or the effects of marketable title acts,m
for instance, we should leave it to the landowner to decide whether to bring
an inverse condemnation action for a mandamus, requiring the government
to exercise eminent domain and appropriate the reversionary property
rights, or to bring a suit for damages to their property rights from the
expansion of the railroad use to a railroad and trail use.3 4 If the landowner
Rights,Fedemi RailroadGrants,andEconomic History: Hash v. United States and the Threatto
Rail-TralConversions,38 ENVTL. L. 711 (2008).

372 The common law typically distinguishes between vested property rights and contingent
property rights, which is why the rule against perpetuities, for instance, does not work a taking;
it terminates only contingent property rights. See DANAYA C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ESTATES AND
FUTURE INTERESTS: CASES, EXERCISES, AND EXPLANATIONS 171 (lst ed. 2015) [hereinafter WRIGHT,
ESTATES]. Marketable title acts, stale uses and reversions acts, and the rule against perpetuities
all operate to terminate contingent future interests that serve only as a cloud on title. See id. at
137-71 (explaining how marketable title acts, stale uses and reversions acts, statutes of
limitations, and other statutory mechanisms terminate contingent future interests). The
railbanking statute operates in much the same way.
373 Marketable title acts were subject to takings challenges, but most survived so long as the
rights destroyed were unvested, and the landowner had a suitable period to preserve her rights.
See, e.g., Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 531 (1982); Biltmore Village v. Royal 71 So. 2d 727, 72729 (Fla. 1954); see also WRIGHT, ESTATES, supranote 372, at 148-49.
374 The term inverse condemnation has been adopted by numerous modem courts to refer
to regulatory takings, as though the government by regulation is doing the opposite of what it
should do directly through eminent domain. See Michael Rikon, Inverse Condemnation, 67 N.Y.
ST. B. J., Dec. 1995, at 28, 28. However, the term inverse condemnation was originally used to
describe a private cause of action for mandamus to require a local government, or more
frequently a railroad or other common carrier corporation, to initiate condemnation
proceedings rather than simply trespass and enter land without tendering compensation. Id
Inverse condemnation referred to a condemnation action brought by the landowner not for
compensation directly, but for a mandamus to require the state or private corporation to
condemn and pay for the land they have taken. Roger A. Cunningham, Inveise Condemnationas
a Remedy for "RegulatoryTadngs",8 HASTINGS CONST. L Q. 517, 528 (1980-1981).
When land is damaged by a condemnation action, or a landowner suffers damages as a result of
an eminent domain action, or the failure of the entity to initiate condemnation, an action for
damages may be appropriate. But it is important to note that inverse condemnation is a cause of
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does not bring suit within a reasonable period of time, her right to do so
terminates, as is the case with marketable title acts and other statutes of
limitations. 7 We can think of railbanking and interim trail use as a taking of
an additional easement for a recreational trail, or an expansion of the scope
and burden of a railroad easement on the one hand, or as a taking of a
reversionary right on the other. In the former, the damages are likely to be
limited because the railroad easement is an exclusive possessory right in the
railroad and the additional use is fairly insignificant. 376 In the latter,
compensation would be due for the taking of a contingent future interest, an
interest that would normally have a fairly low value because it is not certain
to ever vest.
I would also assert that without the exercise of eminent domain and an
appropriation, the landowner retains her reversionary interest, but it is
subject to evolving shifts in the legal definition of the events that trigger it.
For as many courts have stated: no one has a vested right in a particular
statutory scheme.37 The railbanking statute operates like the ubiquitous
marketable title act and statute of limitation to modify the time allowed for,
and the requirements of triggering events that cause, forfeiture of land.
However, if compensation is paid, then the landowner gives up all claims to
the railroad corridor land and provides a deed, to be recorded, and to
indicate that the future possessory rights to the land now lie with the federal
government. Then, the land office should convey those rights to whoever
succeeds to the railroad's property rights in its corridor and that successor
should not be liable, again, if the corridor land is used for other public
purposes, like recreational trails or utilities.378 If the land is later abandoned,
it would then revert to the government and not the private landowner who
was already compensated for her future interest.
One of the many ironies of the incoherence of the regulatory takings
doctrine in the context of railbanking is that landowners are paid
compensation for the mere postponement in their contingent right to
possession, but they are also compensated because a new recreational trail

action requesting the exercise of eminent domain, not a cause of action for damages as a result
of regulatory action. See Kobach, supranote 2, at 1227 n.88.
375 WRIGHT, ESTATES, supra note 372, at 162-63. Marketable title acts operate to terminate
contingent future interests in land that hamper marketability. Most acts have been held to be
constitutional, even though they destroy property rights, either because the landowner has a
sufficient opportunity to protect her property rights, or because the rights are deemed to be too
contingent and therefore too speculative to be the subject of a taking. See WRIGHT, ESTATES,
supranote 372, at 148-49.
376 In the case of commercial easements in gross (of which a railroad easement is a typical
example), the easements are generally deemed to be freely transferable, divisible, and
apportionable without consideration of the underlying fee owner's rights because the
underlying fee owner does not have the right to joint possession of the land. See RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF PROPERTY §§ 489-495 (AM. LAW INST. 1936).
377 See, e.g., Moon v. N. Idaho Farmer's Assn., 96 P.3d 637, 646 (Idaho 2004); Burns v. Burns,
11 N.W.2d 461, 461 (Iowa 1943); The Port of New York Authority v. Heming, 34 N.J. 144, 155
(1961); Perez v. Marshall, 946 F. Supp. 1521,1530 (S.D. Cal. 1996)..
378 Kaseburg v. Port of Seattle, No. C14-0784 JCC, 2015 WL 6449305, at *5 (W. Wash. Oct. 23,
2015).
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easement is imposed, above and beyond the railroad easement.79 However,
since they do not have the present possessory rights in the land, it is difficult
to see how the imposition of a trail easement burdens any property right
they possess. Rationalizing the law of eminent domain, returning to Justice
Holmes's admonition that eminent domain should be exercised, and
requiring that a cognizable property right be appropriated if compensation is
paid for a regulatory taldng will help draw a line between appropriatory
regulations and mere non-compensable land use restrictions that adjust the
benefits and burdens of modern life.
If the Court were to return to a more robust sense of eminent domain to
fill the gap currently occupied by its incoherent regulatory takings doctrine,
there would have to be some parameters to avoid creating a similar
incoherence. As state courts noted time and again, whether a regulation
rises to the level of requiring eminent domain depended on the justification
for the regulation and the effect on the property owner. To the extent the
Court resurrects some analysis of the state's justification, despite Lingle, one
can assume that this element would be fairly straightforward. The more
difficult element, as it currently is with regulatory takings, is what property
right is being affected. Without following the rabbit hole of conceptual
severance and the denominator problem, the Court would need to rationally
circumscribe its eminent domain jurisprudence. One way would be to
require that when compensation is paid, some cognizable property right
must be appropriated.
The Court has stated in its regulatory takings cases that the issue is not
about what the government receives but rather what the landowner loses.38
That is backwards. If the government is paying compensation it must receive
something. That something, as with all eminent domain actions, must be a
recognizable property right, a property right that can be transferred by deed
and can be recorded at the courthouse. Thus, fee title, a leasehold, an
easement, a future interest, a servitude, or even a profit are all recognized
property interests that have existed and been marketable for centuries. Mere
limitations on use do not rise to the level of recognized property rights, for
landowners do not have a vested property right in dumping sawdust into a
river, removing sand and gravel from lands over which the public has a right
of access, or inflicting external harms on neighbors through noise, air
pollution, odors, and the like. Although requiring a cognizable property right
and actually appropriating it may still yield some uncertainty at the margins,
many regulatory takings puzzles could be easily resolved. For instance,
limitations on how, where, and how high one can build on one's own land is
not an appropriation of a cognizable property right except, perhaps, in New
York City which has a market in transferable air rights.8' Other regulatory
379 See Wright, supra note 359, §78A. 13.
380 Penn Central,438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978).
381 CITY OF N.Y. DEP'T OF CITY PLANNING, A SURVEY OF TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS

CITY 3 (2015), https://permacc3BLM-WU2E. Thus, under an eminent
domain approach, Penn Central might have been entitled to compensation although the ability
to transfer its air rights may offset any compensation due. See discussion infa Part V.E. But
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effects, like permit requirements, exactions, development limits, and the like
would not be compensable because those regulations do not prohibit all
uses and do not affect cognizable property rights.
E. Balance the Benefits andBurdens
Justice Holmes stated in Penn Coalthat government hardly could go on
if it had to pay for every change to the common law.m That philosophy has
been a core principle- of the common law since its origin. Behind that
principle is a recognition that government provides benefits as well as.
burdens to property, liberty, and civil rights.m With Bell and Parchomovsky's
groundbreaking article in 2001, the recognition of givings has gained traction
in takings scholarship although not so much in takings jurisprudence. Bell
and Parchomovsky explored how government creates value all the time, yet
only when it takes value do people complain and demand compensation."'
Yet, when Justice Holmes spoke of a reciprocity of advantage in Penn Coal,
he was alluding to a long-standing principle of eminent domain that
compensation should be reduced or eliminated if government action also
provides substantial benefits. This idea, hotly contested in Penn Centrals
discussion of the role of transferable development rights,m has not been
adequately resolved and remains a subject of controversy in the Court's
regulatory takings jurisprudence. We see it in Home v. US Departmentof
Agr/culture,when Justice Breyer dissented on the theory that the increased
value to the Homes' retained raisins should offset the costs of the raisins
that were appropriated to maintain a stable market.' It also appeared in the
exactions cases, especially Nollan v. California Coastal Council, in the
discussion of how the government benefit of being able to build a bigger and
more valuable beach house should be offset against the burden of having to
surrender a public beach easement.3 7 It is notable that only the liberal wing
of the Court has argued that offsetting benefits belongs in the regulatory
takings calculation, for the conservative wing rejects any linkages with the
doctrine's origins in eminent domain.w
In the case of eminent domain, benefits from public works were
routinely offset against the harms caused by disruptions to businesses or to
land being appropriated. Where a railroad appropriated a strip of land

David Lucas would not be entitled to compensation as he still owns his land and can still profit
from it. See Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031-32 (1991). The obligation to pay pension benefits in
Eastern Enterpises,or to apply IOLTA funds for legal aid in Brown and PhL ps do not involve
cognizable property rights of the sort typically protected under eminent domain law.
382 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
383 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supranote 244, at 578.
384 Id at550-51.
385 See 438 U.S. at 150-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

386 See 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2434-36 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
387 Nollan, 483 U.S. 825, 856-57 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
388 See, e.g., Home, 135 S. Ct. at 2434-36; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 825, 856 (illustrating how liberal
Justices like Breyer and Brennan argue that offsetting benefits belongs in the regulatory takings
calculation, while it is absent in the conservative Justices' opinions).
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through private property, courts regularly adjusted the compensation due to
recognize that the addition of the railroad would often dramatically increase
the value of the retained land.'
Thomas Cooley explained that the mere "benefit and protection [one]
receives from the government are not sufficient compensation; for those
benefits are the equivalent for the taxes he pays, and the other public
burdens he assumes in common with the community at large."3 ° However,
when special benefits arise from government action, it is possible that
compensation will be zero. Cooley explained:
When, however, only a portion of a parcel of land is appropriated, just
compensation may perhaps depend upon the effect which the appropriation
may have on the owner's interest in the remainder, to increase or diminish its
value, in consequence of the use to which that taken is to be devoted, or in
consequence of the condition in which it may leave the remainder in respect to
convenience of use. If, for instance, a public way is laid out through a tract of
land which before was not accessible, and if in consequence it is given a front,
or two fronts, upon the street, which furnish valuable and marketable sites for
building lots, it may be that the value of that which remains is made, in
consequence of taking a part, vastly greater than the whole was before, and
that the owner is benefited instead of damnified by the appropriation. Indeed,
the great majority of streets in cities and villages are dedicated to the public use
by the owners of lands, without any other compensation or expectation of
compensation than the increase in market value;... It seems clear that, in
these cases, it is proper and just that the injuries suffered and the benefits
received, by the proprietor, as owner of the remaining portion of the land,
should be taken into account in measuring the compensation.&'
The Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence seems to have lost track
of this important aspect of eminent domain, a feature that should be
returned to its rightful place if the Court could turn back to the long-standing
traditions of eminent domain. And ironically, where states modified their
laws to adjust or eliminate this long-standing principle, it was only in the
case of private corporations, like railroads, who were expected to
compensate for the land without reference to the benefits accruing to the

389 Upton v. S. Reading R.R. Branch Co., 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 600, 600-01 (1851); McIntire v.
State, 5 Blackf. 384, 384-85, 389 (Ind. 1840); Little Miami R.R. Co. v. Collett, 6 Ohio St. 182, 182,
185-87 (1856). As the century wore on, however, a number of courts ruled that private railroads
could not offset benefits although public entities could. See e.g, Isom v. Miss. Cent. R.R. Co., 36
Miss. (7 George) 300, 313 (1858); E. Tenn. and Va. R.R. Co. v. Love, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 63, 63
(1859); Weckler v. City of Chi., 61 Ill. 142 142-43,149-50 (1871).
390 COOLEY, supranote 326, at 559. See Palmer Co. v. Fenill, 34 Mass. (17 Pick.) 58, 58, 64
(1835) (where "the respondent cannot give in evidence by way of set-off to the damage done to
the land flowed, the consequential benefits resulting to the complainant from the erection of the
dam, by reason of an increase of population, markets, schools, stores, and other improvements
in the vicinity[,]" because "the supposed benefits arising from the increased general prosperity
to a settlement... are too contingent, remote and indirect to be brought into consideration").
391 COOLEY, supranote 326, at 565.
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landowner from the development of the railroad, and this occurred only in
the later part of the nineteenth century.m
When Justice Holmes wrote of reciprocity of advantage, this offsetting
of burdens and benefits is what he meant, for it was a common
understanding of his day: 3 Only when landowners faced unique or unusual
burdens, not offset by any special benefits, would compensation be due.
Certainly this occurred when all of a landowner's land was physically
appropriated. And it could occur when the unique characteristics of land
resulted in unique harms from regulation or from a partial taking.9 But
where government action provided unique benefits, beyond the mere
security of living in a society protected by the rule of law, then those
benefits should offset the unique harms faced by property owners whose
rights are taken or infringed to provide public benefits.
This principle operates in countless cases. Landowners whose land was
flooded by a mill dam found their compensation offset by any benefits to
them directly from the presence of the dam.!" Similarly, landowners whose
land was taken for streets or canals would have the increased value offset
7
against the harms of the taldng. 6 The same was true for railroads.2 And
8
benefits are still considered today in eminent domain cases. Although
courts are careful to exclude the negative effects the proposed project might
inflict as a result of the announcement of the public project (the projectinfluence rule), they continue to offset special benefits.39 Yet the Court
rarely discusses benefits directly in regulatory takings cases. This oversight
has, I would argue, further intensified the conflicts and incoherence of the
doctrine.
One might object that in the context of regulatory takings, offsetting
benefits would be much more difficult because regulations tend to have
general applicability and thus would yield generalized benefits. In many
See JAMES ELY, RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAw 189-94 (2001); see also NiCHOis, Supra
note 8, at 783-84.
393 In fact, when he served on the Massachusetts Supreme Court he wrote the opinions in
Smith v. City of Worcester, 182 Mass. 232, 234 (1902), and Sears v. Bd of Street Comnrn'.s of
BostoiA 180 Mass. 274, 278-79 (1902), which expressly offset benefits against the costs of
government action.
394 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, PartialTakings, 117 COLUM. L. REv. 2043,
2055-60 (2017).
395 See Avery v. Van Deusen, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 182, 182-84 (1827); PalmerCo., 34 Mass. (17
Pick.) 58, 60-61 (1835).
396 See In re Furman St, 17 Wend. 649, 659 (1836); Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Key, 3
Cranch C.C. 599, 601 (1829); James River & Kanawha Co. v. Turner, 36 Va. (9 Leigh) 313, 318-19
(1838); Jacob v. City of Louisville, 39 Ky. (9 Dana) 114, 116 (1839); Symonds v. City of
Cincinnati, 14 Ohio 147, 175 (1846) (dissenting strongly that benefits should not be offset).
397 See M'ntire v. State, 5 Blackf. 384, 387-89 (Ind. 1840); Woodfolk v. Nashville &
Chattanooga R.R. Co., 32 Tenn. (2 Swan) 422, 427, 436-37 (1852); Greenville & Columbia R.R.
Co. v. Partlow, 39 S.C.L. (5 Rich.) 428, 437 (1852); Milwaukee & Miss. R.R. Co. v. Eble, 4 Chand..
72, 84-85 (Wis. 1851).
398 See CED Properties, LLC v. City of Oshkosh, 909 N.W.2d 136, 141 (Wis. 2018); Borough of
Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A-3d 534, 526-27 (N.J. 2013).
399 See, e.g, Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, 421 S.W.3d 118, 151-52 (Tex. App. 2013);
Gomez v. Kanawha Cty. Comm'n, 787 S.E.2d 904, 915-16 (W. Va- 2016).
392
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respects, of course, that is the point. Where mere regulations simply devalue
certain property but yield overall generalizable benefits, there should be no
constitutional obligation to compensate. Only where there are special
consequential damages as a result of unique harms that fall on a small
number of landowners should compensation be an issue, and for those
landowners the benefits of the regulation, if any, should be taken into
account and offset against the harms of the regulation. For example, in the
railbanking case, if the presence of a recreational trail adjacent to a
landowner's home raises the market value of her home from its prior value
with only an adjacent railroad track, then that increase in market value
should be taken into account when considering just compensation.
Assuming that railbanking takes a trail easement or takes the reversionary
future interest, the value of those interests should be offset by any increase
in the value of the remaining property.
It is illogical that benefits are not considered in the Court's regulatory
takings jurisprudence when they are so clearly a factor in eminent domain.
Thus, by requiring an act of eminent domain and an appropriation of a
cognizable property right, courts can better determine what constitutes just
compensation and move us beyond the incoherence of regulatory takings
that look only at the harm to the property owner and not the regulation's
benefits to the public or to the private owner. Only by looking holistically at
all the effects can the true impact of a regulation be determined. And the fact
that courts do so in eminent domain and not in regulatory takings highlights
how courts got off the just compensation rails and illustrates how judges
find it easier to strengthen private property rights and discount the public
interest. Whether they favor private property rights because they are elected
or because the narrative of government-as-Goliath speaks to a powerful
constituency is not the question. The real question is how we get back to a
coherent and historically grounded jurisprudence of eminent domain.
Hence, bringing the public interest back from the wrong turn the Court
made in Lingle, reviving the harm/benefit distinction of nuisance, focusing
on the sensible precedents from the law of eminent domain, and better
addressing the benefits of regulations can help make the law of regulatory
takings more consistent, historically accurate, and rational. Doing so can
also help distinguish between government actions that balance the benefits
and burdens of modem life and those that force some to bear burdens that,
in all fairness, should be borne by the public at large.
VI. CONCLUSION

The history of regulatory takings, and the extensive and varied
scholarship criticizing the doctrine from just about every angle, suggest that
it may be time to give up on the experiment. It has been around for nearly
half a century and we are no closer to a set of defining principles than we
were in 1978 other than "I know it when I see it." "Justice and fairness" are
laudable goals but they are not very predictable tools for governments trying
to cope with excessive development, environmental degradation, climate
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change, natural disasters, and a politically divided nation. So one solution
would be to jettison the doctrine entirely and permit governments to
regulate and limit property as they choose, subject only to rational basis
scrutiny and compensation only when they appropriate title or physically
invade land. This might appeal to some true originalists, but is not likely to
appeal to the conservative wing of the Court which thinks that the modem
regulatory state is out of control. Without a return to Lochnerism, they don't
want to give up the only tool they have to rein in governments that
gerrymander property rights.
Justice Thomas's admission, however, may presage that the smoke and
mirrors of the regulatory takings doctrine is clearing. But the fact that there
is no clear constitutional basis for the doctrine does not mean there is not a
legitimate need to limit overzealous regulatory actions in some
circumstances. Just as abolishing the Equal Protection Clause would not
make everyone suddenly equal, abolishing regulatory takings doctrine will
not make the fact of regulatory takings disappear. So after Murr one must
ask: has the death knell been sounded and, if so, do we need to find an
alternative mechanism (due process? equal protection? privileges and
immunities?) to strike an appropriate balance between the interests of
private property and the police power? If not, will regulatory takings
continue to have vitality, despite its lack of constitutional pedigree and its
use in overtly political ways? My solution is a return to a more robust and
historically-grounded version of eminent domain, with a strong reliance on
nuisance and a balancing of the public interest.
With the Lochner-era elevation of private property rights, the
vocabulary of eminent domain was eventually dropped, as it was in Penn
Coal, and the language of the Takings Clause focused on regulatory effects,
not public benefits. Thus, the Court's decision in Lingle to entirely eradicate
the public interest element in regulatory takings law was the final straw
undermining the common law of eminent domain that prevailed in land-use
regulation disputes for nearly two centuries. Going back to eminent
domain-and embracing its ability to distinguish between regulations that
do not require compensation and those that do-will recalibrate the public
interest element while also recognizing that the long-standing common law
doctrine of sic utere can provide appropriate protections for private
property without descending to the constitutional quagmire of regulatory
takings.
Like many commentators before me, I recognize the difficulty of reining
in exuberant governments while forestalling gamesmanship by clever
landowners who see the government as a deep pocket. Government can
.go[] too far" in Justice Holmes's iconic phrase, and some constitutional
brake must be applied. At the same time, landowners, like taxpayers, look
for loopholes to minimize costs and maximize returns on their property.
While the law permits such rent-seeking behavior, in most regulatory takings
cases landowner freedoms and compensation come at the cost of other

4M

Pennsylvania Coa4 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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landowners who bear the brunt of excessive development, degradation of
water supplies, over-use of public facilities and utilities, and very real harms
from trespass and nuisance. If a landowner is compensated for restrictions
to her property, that money comes from the public treasury and has an
impact on everyone. Recalibrating the constitutional protections of property
back to their due process and eminent domain elements can help us regain
control of a constitutional doctrine that has no basis in the Constitution,
works against the public interest, and has revived Lochner-era property
protections that operate against the private property rights of the average
taxpayer.

